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This dissertation studies two aspects of the implications of liquidity risk-taking
by financial institutions on the economy: first, its effects on macroeconomic volatility
and the likelihood of financial distress; second, how the exposure to this source of
risk is relevant in determining the failure of financial institutions in times of stress.
Optimal regulatory responses are derived in the essays on both the macroprudential
and the microprudential front.
The first essay develops a welfare theoretic model to study prudential regula-
tion in an emerging market economy that is facing large short-term capital inflows
into the banking system. The prospect of a sudden reversal of those flows exposes
the economy to liquidity risk. In the model banks finance investments in short-
term and long-term assets by borrowing both locally and externally. Government
intervention is rationalized with an externality arising from financial frictions. The
potential disruption in external financing constitutes the only source of aggregate
risk. The analysis shows that inefficient equilibria exist. In those equilibria banks
underinsure against external financing shocks. The underinsurance is the result of
excessive external borrowing together with a relative overinvestment in short-term
assets. In the proposed setup efficiency is restored by complementing liability-side
instruments, such as unremunerated reserve requirements, with asset-side instru-
ments, such as taxes on short-term assets. The theoretical contribution is twofold:
First, the framework rationalizes policy action with instruments that attack distor-
tions in the asset side of banks’ balance sheet. Second, the analysis points to the
systemic exposure to liquidity risk of banks as being the source of concern and the
key vulnerability explaining output collapse after an external financing shock. The
latter implication is tested by constructing an index that captures such exposure.
Extending a methodology recently introduced by Basel III, the index is developed
for a sample of 40 emerging markets and developing countries, covering the financial
statements of 1,700 banks. It is shown that the index is a robust explanatory vari-
able for unexpected output declines across emerging markets, after the Lehman’s
bankruptcy.
The second essay studies the determinants of bank failure during the global
financial crisis. It exploits a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in
the U.S. and Europe from 2001 to 2009 to analyze the evolution of bank funding
structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and to study the implications
for financial stability. Careful measurement of exposure to liquidity risk is achieved
by employing a recently introduced metric, the NSFR, by Basel III. The results
show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-
crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also
increases with bank risk-taking. The main finding of the essay is that, in the cross-
section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to
liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency
risk due to excessive leverage. The results point to potentially large gains in moving
to international banking regulatory standards that are designed to contemplate the
heterogeneity of vulnerabilities across different banks.
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Financial crises in both industrialized and emerging market economies have
highlighted the relevance of understanding how risk taking by financial institutions
build-up systemic financial risk. The recent global financial crisis that started in the
summer of 2007 is the latest example. A wave of bank failures in the industrialized
world, plus prospects of failure of existing banks, were at the core of the collapse in
credit that significantly altered the performance of the economy and the well-being
of millions. In emerging market economies, thousands of miles from the epicenter of
crisis, the crisis spread through real and financial channels, and the collapse in output
and the rise in unemployment were far worse than in most of the industrialized
economies.
This dissertation presents two essays in which I investigate the relevance for
macroeconomic policy of one specific source of risk taken by financial institutions:
liquidity risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision defines it as the risk
that a bank is unable to fund increases assets or honor its commitments.1 The first
essay studies how the systemic exposure to liquidity risk is the main vulnerability
that emerging market economies build to world-level shocks that are transmitted
through financial channels. The essay develops a welfare theoretic framework useful
to assess the factors that determine the optimality of such exposure and how/when
1See BCBS 2008.
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to regulate it. The second essay analyzes how the exposure to different source of
risks were determinant of the failure of financial institution and focus the analysis
on the relevance of liqudity risk for relatively small institutions.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is as follows: the first section
overviews the analysis and results exposed in ”Systemic Liquidity Risk-Taking in
Emerging Markets” (Chapter 2), and the second section summarizes the exposition
in ”Bank Funding Structure and Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis”
(Chapter 3).
1.1 Systemic Liquidity Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets
This essay studies prudential regulation in an economy where the banking
system is receiving large capital inflows that face the prospects of a sudden reversal.
This is a situation regularly faced by emerging market economies and there is a
large literature documenting stylized facts observed in these episodes.2 However,
relatively little theoretical work has analyzed the reasons why the banking system
may be prone to inefficiencies from an ex-ante perspective, the type of risks that
might be overdone, and the circumstances in which an intervention is warranted, if
at all.
The essay is motivated in two recent set of observations: First, the shock re-
ceived by emerging market economies after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy produced
a new set of empirical evidence on the large costs associated with a sudden deterio-
ration of international funding conditions when the banking system is vulnerable. A
2see Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) and references therein.
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number of countries in Eastern Europe, which had their banking systems heavily ex-
posed to liquidity risk, after receiving large capital inflows after their commitment to
join the European Union became evident, suffered output collapses of around 20 per-
cent of GDP in the three quarters following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Second,
during the second semester of 2009 there was a resumption of large capital inflows
to emerging market economies that encourage their policymakers to intervene in
multiple ways to contain the inflows. Policy prescriptions were both quantity-based
and price-based and include, but are not limited to, limits on growth rate of credit,
caps on the loan-to-deposits ratio, unremunerated reserve requirements on local and
external liabilities, requirements for extra buffers of liquid assets and taxes on con-
sumption loans. Given the variety of policy responses to attack the same problem
it seems a possibility that the literature has not yet identified exactly what is the
market failure that needs to be addressed in these episodes.
The essay develops a welfare theoretic framework in which pecuniary exter-
nalities and financial market imperfections provide the rationale for government
intervention, in the spirit of the literature on systemic risk modeling. A key inno-
vation in the theoretical framework is that banks extend short-term and long-term
credit that is financed with local deposits, that are modeled as a stable source of
funding, and external financing, which is short-term, and needs to be rolled over.
The redemption of external financing is the only source of aggregate risk. My con-
tribution is to show that same externality that is causing the banks to undervalue
insurance ex-ante is producing a distortion in the relative amounts of short-term
and long-term credit. Contrary to standard intuition that would suggest that banks
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need more liquid types of credit to hedge a liquidity problem, I show that banks
have incentives to be already overinvested in short-term credit relative to long-term
credit. Basically when we observe that banks underinsure against liquidity risk is
because they are borrowing and investing excessively. The overinvestment in assets
is a result of the overvaluation of their cash flows. The overvaluation is stronger
for the assets that produce the most cash flow in those states where the incentives
are distorted and the private pricing kernel differs from the social kernel. Thus,
the most liquid types of credit, which pay a larger percentage of their cash-flows in
states where incentives are distorted, are relatively overdone with respect to more
illiquid types of credit.
As a result, any regulatory framework that intends to restore efficiency needs
to attack the distortion that arises in the asset side of banks’ balance sheet. I
set up the Ramsey planner problem and show that a regulatory framework that
achieves efficiency involves a tax on short-term credit together with a tax on external
borrowing.
In addition to the precise policy recommendation the model has a relevant
general implication: it breaks the equivalency that prevails in existing models of
systemic risk where inefficient equilibria display at the same time overborrowing of
external financing, an inefficient credit boom and excessive exposure to liquidity
risk. The framework presented in this essay distinguishes between the first two and
the third and points to excessive exposure to liquidity risk as being the market
failure to be addressed.
As a positive implication, the systemic exposure to liquidity risk should be
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the best indicator of vulnerability against external financing shocks. I construct an
index that captures such exposure by extending a methodology recently introduced
by Basel III. The index is computed for a total sample of 40 emerging market and
developing economies, covering the financial statements of 1,700 banks. I conduct
an event analysis around Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy using the index. The base-
line empirical framework follows Blanchard et al (2010), where the objective is to
explain the cross country variation in unexpected output collapses across emerging
market economies, in the three quarters after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The
literature that analyzed this episode found three financial aggregates to be the best
explanatory variables, namely, the short-term external debt to GDP, the size of the
credit boom previous to the collapse, and the loan-to-deposits ratio of the banking
system. The index I developed is robust in these framework. More importantly it
reduces substantially the explanatory power of other financial aggregates, indicating
that their relevance is partially explained by their capacity to capture the exposure
to liquidity risk of the banking system.
To summarize, the essay shows both theoretically and empirically that the key
vulnerability developed in episodes of large capital inflows into de banking system
is the systemic exposure to the liquidity risk. The essay provides a regulatory
framework that requires instruments that address the exposure both on the asset
and liability side. In addition, it is shown that three financial aggregates that are
being the target of policy prescriptions are in fact symptoms of the more general
problem: the exposure to liquidity risk.
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1.2 Bank Funding Structure and Risk: Evidence from the Global
Financial Crisis
This essay is joint work with Francisco Vazquez and constitutes the third
chapter of the dissertation. Francisco is a senior economist at the International
Monetary Fund. The essay studies the determinants of bank failure across indus-
trialized economies during the global financial crisis. There has been substantial
interest on the matter in light of the proposed reforms on international regulatory
standards for financial institutions. The main areas being discusses are the regula-
tion of leverage and liquidity. The essay sets up an empirical model with various
bank-level and system-level risk indicators that is estimated on a large sample of
banks in the developed world.
Different from previous work, the essay measures structural liquidity and lever-
age in bank balance sheets in a way consistent with the formulations of the Net Sta-
ble Funding Ratio (NSFR), and the leverage ratio (EQUITY) proposed in Basel III.
More over, it explores for systematic differences in the relationship between struc-
tural liquidity, leverage, and subsequent probability of failure across bank types. In
particular, it distinguishes between large, internationally-active banks, and (typi-
cally smaller) banks that focus on their domestic retail markets.
The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher lever-
age in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank
failure also increases with bank risk-taking. Macroeconomic and monetary condi-
tions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing
6
a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.
The main contribution of the essay is to show that, in the cross-section, the smaller
domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while
the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to exces-
sive leverage. This finding let us understand that a one-size fits all approach to
microprudential regulation might have large costs, and that international regulators
should focus on the critical vulnerability each type of bank faces.
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Chapter 2
Systemic Liquidity Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets
2.1 Overview
After the last three decades of experiences with financial crises, and in par-
ticular after the recent crisis, there is a growing concensus that banks are prone to
create systemic financial risk. In emerging markets the concerns seem to be partic-
ularly relevant in circumstances where the banking system is receiving large capital
inflows that are short-term in nature. The perception is that banks do not take the
necessary precautions against an abrupt worsening of external financing conditions,
making the economy excessively vulnerable from an ex-ante perspective.1 Recent
examples that support this view during the last decade include several economies in
Eastern Europe, which enjoyed large banking sector inflows after their commitment
to join the EU became evident. Although the inflows into banks helped finance
substantial economic growth, the disruption of this source of financing associated
with Lehman’s brankrutpcy entailed sharpe contractions in output, consumption
and employment.
These experiences have led policymakers to be increasingly wary about banks’
risk taking in times of inflow bonanzas and to propose various preventive policies
to reduce the build-up of vulnerabilities. Current proposals involve both quantity-
1For the difficulties arising from capital inflows bonanzas, see Reinhart and Reinhart (2008)
and references therein.
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based and price-based regulations.2 Relatively little theoretical work has analyzed
the reasons why the banking system may be prone to inefficiencies from an ex ante
perspective and under what circumstances an interventation is warranted, if at all.
Recent contributions on the study of systemic risk have made progress towards this
goal. This literature explains how the presence of frictions in financial contracts, in
an environment where individual banks ignore the effects of their actions on prices
and returns, can lead to excessive systemic risk.
In this paper I study prudential regulation in a context where banks are receiv-
ing large capital inflows and face the prospects of a sudden reversal of flows. I build a
framework where banks have the ability to invest in short-term and long-term assets
by utilizing both stable and non-stable sources of funding. Like in Lorenzoni (2008),
an externality arising from financial frictions provides the rationale for intervention.
I analyze constrained efficiency by considering a planner who faces the same con-
straints faced by private agents. As in the literature, banks underinsure ex-ante. My
main contribution is to show that the same mechanism that is producing underin-
surance is also distorting the choices between different types of assets. Specifically,
because of their hedging properties, there is an overinvestment in short-term assets
relative to long-term assets. Based on that result, the model breaks the equivalence
prevailing in these class of models between (1) excessive borrowing, (2) an inneficient
credit boom, and (3) overexposure to liquidity risk.3 Indeed, it points to liquidity
2Examples of the most discussed policies include: a cap to the growth in bank credit, a cap to
the loans-to-deposits ratio, an increase in the amount of liquid assets, a tax on short-term external
liabilities, and a tax on short-term loans.
3The definition of liquidity risk is taken from Basel Committee in Banking Supervision: ”Liq-
uidity is the ability of bank to fund increases in assets and honor its obligations as they come
due”. I will concentrate on the first part of the definition, implying that liquidity risk should be
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risk as the key vulnerability to an external funding shock. I test empirically this
implication of the model. For that purpose I develop an index of systemic exposure
to the liquidity risk of banks, across emerging markets, and use it to explain the
heterogeneity in output collapses, after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
The paper develops a three-period model of a small open economy with two
agents, banks and households. In the first period, banks invest in short-term assets
(seeders) and long-term assets (land) in the domestic economy, using local deposits
and external financing. Seeders are liquid, since the return on them is fully received
in the second period. Land pays returns both in the second and third period and
is illiquid, with the degree of illiquidity being determined endogenously. Seeders
and land are required in production in conjunction with households’ labor. Local
deposits are a stable source of funding, while external financing is contracted short-
term and needs to be rolled over. In the second period, the world can be in normal
times, in which case the external financing is rolled over, or in crisis times, in which
case the external financing is redeemed. This rollover risk is the only source of
aggregate risk in the economy. When solving the asset-liability managment problem,
banks implictly choose their exposure to liquidity risk (i.e. their capacity to do new
lending/investments). When the external financing is redeemed, banks are forced
to curtail investment in new seeders, which impairs the productivity of workers and
existing land and leads to a sharp output decline. This is the mechanism linking the
banking system’s exposure to liquidity risk with the collapse of investment, output,
and consumption.
understood as the risk of not being able to finance new credit.
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In the model I introduce financial market imperfections to provide a rationale
for ex-ante prudential regulation. Following Lorenzoni (2008) I model a friction
in the financial contract between banks (borrowers) and households (lenders). In
particular, banks are subject to a borrowing limit in crisis times.4 This friction
results in a pecuniary externality that can lead banks to underestimate the social
value of liquidity ex-ante. This happens becuase banks’ decisions in the first pe-
riod redistribute liquidity between households and banks in the second period. The
mechanism works through the returns on factors of production. Every time that a
single banks decides to invest more in assets, it is lowering the marginal productivity
of these assets, and consequently the amount of liquidity that banks will have in the
second period. But at the same time it is increasing the marginal productivity of
workers, and consequently the amount of liquidity that households will have in the
second period. In an environment without any friction, banks could access house-
holds’ liquidity when external financing is redeemed, and achieve the level of optimal
investments. However, if a friction prevents banks to have full access to households’
liquidity, the pecuniary externality derives in inefficiencies. A constrained planner,
by internalizing how investment levels affect marginal returns, would choose to in-
vest less in the first period to save more liquidity for banks in the second period. In
that way the collapse of invesments in crisis times is less pronounced, and socially
optimal.
My main theoretical result is to show that, in those circumstances, the same
4Lorenzoni (2008) derives this contraint from a contracting problem in an environment with
limited commitment. I am going to use this constraint in reduce form and extend the framework
in other dimensions.
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pecuniary externality produces a distortion in the choice of different assets. When
the marginal returns on assets is lower than the efficient level, it is because banks
are investing too much ex ante. Excessive investments result from banks overvaluing
the payoffs of the assets. Specifically the overvaluation comes from payoffs in crisis
times: when banks do not internalize that decreasing the returns reduce the liquidity
available to invest. The natural question is whether some type of asset is overvalued
relatively more. The answer is that the assets that produce more cash flow in that
scenario will be overvalued more (i.e. the assets that best hedge the liquidity risk
introduced by external borrowing).
In inefficient equilibria, there is overborrowing of external financing together
with a relative overinvestment in short-term assets with respect to long-term assets.
I show that any regulatory framework designed to restore efficiency must address the
asset side of the banks’ balance sheet. In particular, the investment in short-term
assets needs to be discourage relative to the investment in long-term assets. A system
of unremunerated reserve requirements in conjunction with a tax in short-term assets
achieves efficiency. In that sense, the model illustrates the idea that, in times of
large capital inflows into the banking system, emerging markets rely excessively
on short-term credit (typically consumptions credit) rather than long-term credit.
The model gives a rationale for the strategy undertaken by the Government of
Brazil at the height of the recent capital inflow episode, who introduced a system of
unremunerated reserve requirements on short-term external liabilities in conjunction
with a tax on consumption loans in April 2011.
The model yields two implications that are tested empirically. First, it high-
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lights that the systemic exposure to the liquidity risk of banks is the key vulnerability
explaining output collpase after an external financing shock. Second, the model de-
livers unsually high external short-term debt, high growth of bank credit to GDP,
and high loans-to-deposits ratio at the same time that the systemic exposure to
liquidity risk is unusually high. Recent literature finds strong support for the first
three as indicators of vulnerability to external financing shocks (Berkmen et al,
2009; Blanchard et al, 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010). The model suggests
that their empirical success might be explained, at least partially, by their capacity
to capture exposure to liquidity risk, when the latter is not controlled for.5 My
empirical results give support to both implications.
To conduct the empirical test I develop an index of systemic exposure to liq-
uidity risk of a banking system. For this purpose, I extend a methodology recently
introduced by international banking regulators (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision - BCBS -, 2009 and 2010) which measures liquidity risk from balance sheet
quantities. The index is constructed from microdata (i.e. banks’ financial state-
ments) obtained from Bankscope and incorporates three databases on aggregate
variables for adjustment purposes. I compute the index for the banking system of
40 emerging markets and developing countries, with a total sample of 1,700 banks.
My strategy involves testing the index using an event analysis around Lehman’s
bankruptcy, which constituted a large external financing shock for emerging mar-
kets.6 I follow the empirical approach from the recent literature that makes use of
5It is worth to mention that the test of the Index correspond to one shock: Lehman’s
Bankruptcy. However, further empirical analysis is required to determine the robustness of the
results, including other episodes of exogenous funding shocks.
6Lehman’s bankruptcy did not only lead to contagion of the crisis through funding channels
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the same event to study the vulnerabilities and characteristics that best explain the
output collapse across countries. Specifically my framework follows closely Blan-
chard et al (2010). In section IV, I show that the index is a robust explanatory
variable of unexpected output decline accross emerging markets, after Lehman’s
bankruptcy. Moreover, the index reduces substantially the explanatory power of
the other financial indicators of vulnerability.
Many accounts of financial crises in emerging markets have emphasized the
role of the banking system in causing or propagating the crisis. Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) show empirically how problems in the banking system typically
preceed currency crises. Chang and Velasco (1998,1999) make the closest argument
to the one developed in this paper. The authors argue that the 1997 Asian crisis
can be explanied by the large amount of short-term hard-currency liabilities in
the banking system relative to the hard-currency it could access in short notice.
Based on the ratio of external liabilities to reserves, they suggest that the Asian
countries were more vulnerable than their Latin American peers. Edwards and Vegh
(2007) present evidence that the banking system propagates external macroeconomic
shocks. Although they do not conduct a normative analysis, the authors model an
open economy to account for the main empirical regularities.
The theoretical framework relates to the large literature on the role of financial
frictions in amplifying and propagating aggregate shocks, including the prominent
contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and
but also through trade and other channels. The empirical framework I follow controls for them.
However, many researches have claimed that the funding channels seem the most relevant. See
Berkmen et al (2009), Blanchard et al (2010), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) and Cecchetti et al
(2011).
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Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Within that literature, models that study preven-
tive policies from a second-best perspective include Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001,2003), Allen and Gale (2004), Lorenzoni (2008), Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvin-
ski (2009), Korinek (2009), Jeanne and Korinek (2011) and Mendoza and Bianchi
(2011). This paper shows that the same externality that leads descentralized agents
to underinsure creates a distortion in the choice of different types of assets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the model. Section III
presents the theoretical results and compares current regulatory proposals. Section
IV describes the empirical tests and provides support for the model (while appendix
A discusses the construction of the index in detail). Section V concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of identical house-
holds of mass one. The households that live three periods (t = 0, 1, 2). Each house-
hold owns a bank, also identical. The sum of banks constitute the banking system.
The economy produces one consumption good, which is tradable and non-storable,
and can be borrowed and loaned internationally. The consumption good can be
turned into any of two capital goods, seeders (s) and land(l), one for one, althought
the opposite is not feasible. There is only one source of aggregate risk, revealed in
t = 1, where the state of nature (i) can be either normal (n) with probability θ, or
crisis (z) with probability 1−θ. As will be explained later, the state is only relevant
if the economy is borrowing from the external sector, in which case the external
financing is rolled over in state n and reedemed in state z.
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Households
Households receive an endowment consumption goods, e , in t = 0, and con-
sume in t = 1, 2. Their preferences are represented by linear utility function:7
E0U = E (c1 + c2) (2.1)
where, for simplicity, the intertemporal discount factor has been set to one.
They work in t = 1, 2 by supplying a fixed amount of labor, h. Each household owns
a bank, but its managment is delegated to a banker. Households can deposit their
initial endowment with the external sector, for an amount f , or they can enter into
a financial contract with the bank. They receive the international gross interest rate
R = 1 on their deposits with the external sector. The financial contract with the
bank, specified at t = 0, is state-contingent and takes the form {d0, (d1i, d2i)}. The
contract specifies a loan d0 in t = 0 from the household to the bank (local deposits)
and state-contingent payments d1i and d2i from the bank to the household in t = 1
and t = 2 for state i. The solution to this contract is derived later. The budget
constraints for state i, at t = 1, 2, are given by
c1i = w1h+ d1i + f0 − f1i (2.2)
c2i = w2ih+ d2i + f1i (2.3)
This setup defines a simple role of households in the economy, allowing us to
concentrate in the decision problem of banks.
Banks
7To save on notation we omit individual subscripts.
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Banks solve an asset-liability management problem in t = 0, 1. The objective
is to maximize expected intertemporal profits, internalizing households’ preferences.
Since I am not going to model any friction between banks and their corporate clients,
I merge them into a bank that invests in real assets. I explain their optimization
problem at each date:
• The t = 0 problem: Banks choose their initial funding and investment strategy.
The funding consists of local deposits, d0, and external financing, b0 (b0 can
be negative, in which case banks are lending to the external sector). External
financing is assumed to be short-term and subject to potential redemptions.
In t = 1 the aggregate uncertaintly is revealed. If the state is n, b0 is rolled
over, and the full amount is repaid in t = 2. If the state is z, b0 is redeemed
fully.8 The cost of external financing is given by RB and its determination is
explained below.
Banks invest in two asset classes in the economy: short-term assets, s0, and
long-term assets, l0. I will refer to s0 as seeders and l0 as land. Seeders mature
in t = 1 and their return is given by rS1 . Land matures in t = 2 and produce
returns both in t = 1, rL1 , and in t = 2, r
L
2i. In addition, banks can sell l0 in





on the state. The resulting buget constraint of the representative bank at
t = 0 is given by
l0 + s0 = d0 + b0 (2.4)
8The assumption is that redemptions are for the full amount. Assuming that they are a
proportion does not change the results.
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I assume that banks are the only agents capable of investing in assets in
the economy. Households cannot directly invest in assets since they lack the
expertise to operate them.
• The t = 1 problem: Banks start the period learning whether the external
financing, b0, is redeemed or rolled over. With the proceeds from their invest-
ments, rS1 s0 + r
L
1 l0, and the potential cash-flow from selling land, p
L
1il0, they
invest in new seeders, s1i, and in new land, l1i, repay the external financing
if recalled and transfer d1i to households. In t = 1 the supply of seeders if
infinitely elastic and the supply of land is infinitely inelastic. Thus, in t = 1,
new seeders can be converted one-to-one with consumption goods, but the only
way to acquire new land is by paying the market price pL1i to current owners
(ie. other banks). The resulting budget constraint of the representative bank
in state i is given by:
rL1 l0 + r
S
1 s0 + p
L
1i(l0 − l1i) = s1i + d1i + I iRBb0 (2.5)
where I i is an indicator function that satisfies Iz = 1 and In = 0.
In t = 2 banks collect the proceeds from their investments in t = 1, repay the
external financing if rolled over in t = 1 and transfer d2i to households. The budget
constraint for state i is
rL2il1i + r
S
2is1i = d2i + (1− I i)RBb0 (2.6)
Financial Contracts
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There are two financial contracts to solve, one between banks and the external
sector and another between banks and households. When households and banks
deposit with the external sector, they receive the international gross interest rate
R = 1. When banks are borrowing from the external sector, I am going to assume
that the claim is the most senior and that the contract is enforceable in international
courts at no cost. The result is a riskless claim with a cost of RB = R = 1.
As explained above, the financial contract between households and banks takes
the form {d0, (d1i, d2i)}. I will introduce a friction in this contract to capture that




Constraint (2.7) captures, in reduced form, the contracting problem modeled in
Lorenzoni (2008).10 In this problem d
¯
can be understood as the maximum amount
of bail-out funds that banks can receive from households in crisis. Households
will participate in the contract only if the expected present discounted value of
repayments is larger than the initial deposit
d0 ≤ θ (d1n + d2n) + (1− θ) (d1z + d2z) (2.8)
Production Technology, Aggregation and Returns








9It can be written symmetrically for any state in t = 1, 2 without changing the results, as will
be explained later.
10In this setup the contracting problem derived from primitives is more complicated because of
the presence of multiple assets and liabilities. I use his result to extend the analysis by studying
the implications of this friction for the current setup.
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where A is a productivity augmenting factor. Aggregate levels of production
factors follow Lt = lt, St = st and Ht = ht. Notice that households’ labor is in
fixed supply, implying Ht = h = H both in t = 1, 2. The market for the factors of
production is competitive and their returns follow from (2.9). As explained above,
and to simplify the solution of the model, I assume that the aggregate amount of
land is determined in t = 0 and cannot be adjusted in latter periods, i.e. L0 = lo =






















{l0, s0, b0, d0, l1i, s1i},and consumption levels {c1i, c2i} that satisfy the equilibrium
conditions of banks and households, the participation constraint and all the market
clearing conditions. The complete setup of the problem is presented in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 An optimal contract between the bank and the household will always have
d0 = e as an equilibrium
Lemma 1 says that households know that banks are going to conduct their
business taking into accounts households’ interests. That is possible because there
is no agency problem between them. When the participation contraint does not
bind, it is because the local deposits are low relative to the amount of investment
opportunities, in which case it is optimal for the banks to borrow from households
and for households to lend their endowment fullly. When the participation constraint
binds, it is because there are more local deposits relative to the domestic invesment
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opportunities. In that case banks will automatically invest the excess local deposits
with the external sector in the same way that households would do. Thus d0 = e is
always an equilibrium. Households cannot do better than this contract.
Lemma 2 There are two types of equilibria. In equibria (A) banks will never hit
the contraint (2.7). In equilibria (B) banks will be constrained in state z and uncon-
strained in the state n. It is nevern an equilibrium for banks to be constrained in
both states.
A proof of the lemma is presented in appendix C. The previous two lemmas
are useful for deriving the solution of the problem. A sufficient condition to be in



















which is guaranteed to be a positive number since 1 − α ≥ β . The previous
condition means that, when households’ endowment is below some threshold, the
amount of external financing that will be borrowed, will lead to a binding constraint
in t = 1. In what follows I assumme that (2.10) holds and analyze the equilibria (B),
which is the interesting case. The equilibrium conditions in t = 1 define a concept
of illiquidity premium in the economy and a price at which land trades:





The quantity λ denotes the multiplier on the financial constraint:
s1z ≤ rL1 l0 + rS1 s0 + pL1z(l0 − l1z)− b0 + d¯ (2.13)
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which is derived from (2.7) and (2.5). Equation (2.11) shows that, in the
scenario where the financial constraint is binding because the external financing
is reedemed, the return on seeders is above the international gross interest rate.
As a result of the shortage of capital, the economy exhibits an illiquidity premium
λ = rS2z−1 > 0. When external financing is rolled over, optimal investment decisions
imply that the return on seeders is equalized to one. Equation (2.12) defines the
price at which land trades in t = 1. When the external financing is recalled, the
price of land declines both for solvency and liquidity considerations. A binding




2n, i.e. the price
declines partially for solvency considerations (ie. lower marginal productivity). But
liquidity considerations also hit the market price of land in t = 1, as captured by
the denominator in equation (2.12). Intutively, in an economy where the return on
seeders has increased because of lack of financing, the return on land needs increase
as well, to prevent arbitrage. That is achieved at a lower price of land. In this
model the liquidity constraint will be explaining expected returns on assets, as will
be clear below.
At t = 0 the equilibrium conditions involve the following euler equations for













= θ + (1− θ)(1 + λ), (2.14)
θrS1 + (1− θ)(1 + λ)rS1 = θ + (1− θ)(1 + λ). (2.15)
The last equation implies rS1 = 1. The left hand sides of (2.14) and (2.15)
capture the marginal benefit of extra land and seeders respecively, while the right
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hand sides capture the cost. It is worth noticing that the cash inflows and outflows
each asset produces in the scenario where the external financing is recalled, (1− θ),
are valued at (1 + λ). As a consequence, assets that produce cash outflows larger
than inflows in that scenario (i.e. land) will need to compensate with higher return
in other scenarios. We can re-write (2.14) and (2.15) as:
rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (1− θ)λrL1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ, (2.16)
rS1 + (1− θ)λrS1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ. (2.17)
For the purpose of having a bencharmk, below I will state the solution for the
type of equilibria (A), where the banks are always unconstrained:


















. Then, S0 = S1n = S1z,
(remember L0 = L1n = L1z)
Proof. Since the aggregate amount of land is the same it t = 1, 2 and the euler
equations require the return on seeders to be one in every state, then the quantity
of seeders needs to be equal in every state. The rest follows from the euler equations
(2.11), (2.12), (2.14) and (2.15).
Naturally, Proposition 3 implies that there is no premium on the returns to
assets in a world where the financial constraint does not bind. However, as I show
below, in equilibria (B), the investment in land pays a premium. The investment
in seeders does not since they provide a perfect hedge from the point of view of the
representative bank.
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Proposition 4 In an economy where the financial constraint is binding in state z
, λ > 0, rS1 = r
S
2n = 1, r
S














Moreover, there is an illiquidity premium on land given by (1 − θ)λ(1 − rL1 ) > 0,
which implies that rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z > 1.
Proof. In state n, λ = 0, and rS1 = 1 follows from (2.17) and r
S
2n = 1 and r
S
2z = 1+λ




2n = 1, the














2z. Remembering that the international cost of funds is assumed to be
R = 1, the illiquidity premium on land also follows from (2.16).
2.2.2 Constrained Planner
A social planner facing the same contraints as descentralized agents achieves
a different solution compared to the competitive equilibrum. The setup of the
problem is described in Appendix C. In period t = 1 the planner has the same
equilibrium conditions defining the investment in new seeders as in the compet-





2 = 1 (which is analogous to (2.11)). When external fi-

















(which is analogous to (2.13)).
The difference between the planner problem and the competitive equilibrium
lies in the definition of S1z : The planner is able to see that the returns on seeders
and land in t = 1 depend on their aggregate levels. That will have an impact in the
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equilibrium conditions at t = 0, which are given by
rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (α + β)(1− θ)λrL1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ (2.18)
rS1 + (α + β)(1− θ)λrS1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ (2.19)
It is worth to notice that this euler equations differ to ones of the representative
bank only in the valuation of cash-flows produced by assets in crisis (i.e. when the
constraint binds). It is capture by the terms (α+β)(1−θ)λrL1 and (α+β)(1−θ)λrS1 ,
which are lower than (1−θ)λrL1 and (1−θ)λrS1 since α+β < 1. The lower valuation
is because the planner knows that when returns are driven down, the liquidity
available for banks to invest in t = 1 becomes lower. In an economy where banks
have unlimited access households’ liquidity, there is no difference in the valuation of
the planner and the representative bank.
Proposition 5 In a constrained planner solution rS2z > r
S
1 > 1, r
S
2z = 1, the illiq-
uidity premium on land at t=0 is given by (1− θ)λ(1− (α + β)rL1 ) > 0.
Proof. Equation (2.19) implies that rS1 =
1+(1−θ)λ
1+(α+β)(1−θ)λ > 1 since α + β < 1. Since
(1 − θ) < 1 and 1 + (α + β)(1 − θ)λ > 1, rS2z = 1 + λ > rS1 . In addition, rS2n = 1
follows from the euler equaiton in t = 1 (see Appendix C). The illiquidity premium
follows from (2.18).
2.3 Theoretical Results
The theoretical questions that I address in this section are the following (i)
Does the competitive equilibrium achieve an allocation that is socially optimal?
and (ii) What are the regulatory frameworks that would produce a socally optimal
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allocation in a descentrilzed economy? When addressing (ii), I will introduce a set
of policies in the model, which include three policies that gained support after the
recent crisis: (a) a cap on the growth of bank credit to the private sector, (b) a
cap on the loans-to-deposits ratio of the banking system, and (c) a tax on external
financing.
The competitive equlibrium does not produce socially optimal allocations.
Banks have a valuation of insurance in t = 0 that is less than the social valua-
tion. They fail to internalize the effect of their decisions on the returns of seeders
and land in t = 1, and borrow and invest more than what is socially desirable. That
happens becuase banks are unable to see that when they move returns they reduce
the amount of liquidity they have available to invest in the state z. As a result,
the investment in new seeders is suboptimal when the external financing is recalled,
implying lower marginal product of workers and existing land in t = 2.
Proposition 6 The competitive equilibrium does not produce pareto optimal alloca-
tions. Market incompletness results in excessive systemic exposure to liquidity risks
in t=0. If the external financing is recalled in t=1 the economy has an inneficiently
low level of investment in new seeders, imparing the marginal productivy of other
sectors in t=2.




2n+(1−θ)rL2z +(1−θ)λrL1 and ∆Sb = rS1 +(1−θ)λrS1 as
the competitive equilibrium benefit of investing, in t = 0, in an additional land and
seeders respectively. In addition, define ∆Lc = 1 + (1 − θ)λ and ∆Sc = 1 + (1 − θ)λ
as the competitive equilibrium cost of borrowing to invest in the assets. Then the
euler equations of the contrained planner in t = 0 can be re-written as in (2.20) and
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(2.21) (below). The planer has a lower valuation of both assets than descentralized
banks. Since the production function of the economy is strictly concave, efficiency
is achieved by having a lower level of investment and, consequently, of borrowing.
∆Lb − (1− α− β)(1− θ)λrL1 = ∆Lc , (2.20)
∆Sb − (1− α− β)(1− θ)λrS1 = ∆Sc . (2.21)
A fundamental new insight of the model is that the planner chooses to reduce
the investment in seeders more aggresively than the investment in land. There is
nothing inherent in seeders that makes its investment more risky. But in equilibrium
without government policies, the externality induces banks to overdo the investment
in seeders more than the investment in land. The overvaluation of seeders is stronger
because it produces a larger cash flow in state z, exactly the scenario where the
representative bank is overvaluaing the cash-flows of assets.
Proposition 7 In any regulatory framework designed to restore efficiency, the in-
vestment in short-term assets (ie. seeders) needs to be disincentivated more than the
investment in long-term assets (ie. land).
Proof. Using ∆Lb and ∆
S
b as defined in the previous proof, the following relationship
follows from (2.16), (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19):




= ∆Sb . (2.22)






1 holds at the competitive equilibrium
solution, as shown above. The only way to reduce ∆Lb relative to ∆
S





It is worth noticing that, since the welfare function measures expected out-
put, the contrained planner achieves both higher expected output as well as lower
volatility of output.
2.3.1 Plausible Regulatory Frameworks
In this section I derive the equilibrium conditions of descentralized agents
in a model where there are five instruments available to the policymaker. Before
presenting them it is useful to describe the environment and timeline in which they
are introduced. The model can be understood as if in period t=0, before any
decision is made, agents learn the total factor productivity level A and the level of
the international interest rate R which are kept at a constant level for the life of the
economy. The relevance of A and R is in that they determine the set of profitable
investment opportunities of the economy. The relative size of that set versus the size
of local depotis d0 will determine the level of borrowing from the external sector.




> 0 and ∂e
∗
∂R
< 0. A higher A or a lower R enlarges the set of profitable
investment opportunities, and increases the thershold value at which equilibria B
take place.
In this context, there is a regulator who can use any of the following instru-
ments right after the level of A and R are learned, and before agents take their
decisions:
• proportional tax on seeders: tS
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• proportional tax on land: tL
• proportional tax on external financing: tB
• a loans-to-deposits ratio, which introduces the restriction l0+s0
d0
≤ χ1 (Ψ1)
• a cap on the size of credit to the private sector,11 represented by l0 + s0 ≤
χ2 (Ψ2)
Appendix C presents the setup of the problem. The t = 0 equilibrium condi-
tions are given by
rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (1− θ)λrL1 =
(1 + tL)
(1 + tB)
[1 + (1− θ)λ] + Ψ1 + Ψ2, (2.23)
rS1 + (1− θ)λrS1 =
(1 + tS)
(1 + tB)
[1 + (1− θ)λ] + Ψ1 + Ψ2, (2.24)
which are the implementability conditions that a Ramsey planner would use
to solve the optimal policy problem. The main observation to be made is that only
tS and tL can affect the margin that determines the ratio of assets. The policy
variables tB, χ1 and χ2 can only affect the cost of assets in a symmetric way. Using
the results of the previous section, the following proposition follows:
Proposition 8 The regulator must have at least one asset-side instrument to re-
store efficiency.
Proof. Taking the ratio of (2.23) and (2.24) shows that the only instruments capable
of correcting that intra-asset distortion are tS and tL:
rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (1− θ)λrL1
(1 + tL)
=
rS1 + (1− θ)λrS1
(1 + tS)
. (2.25)
11This is analogous to a cap on the growth of bank credit to the private sector. Althought the
model does not have a history, it can be interpreted as a repeated version where, in a second stage,
an increase in A or a decrease in R, results in a larger optimal levle of investment to be made.
Consequently in a larger amount of borrowing from the external sector.
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None of the other instruments can achieve efficiency in the absence of an
asset-side instrument since the system would be incomplete. In this model, there
are multiple regulatory frameworks that achieve efficiency. Since there are two
relevant margins to be affected by the planner, a system of two instruments achieves
efficiency. One of them needs to be an asset side instrument, as argued above. One
system that could restore efficiency involves a tax on external liabilities together
with taxes on short-term assets, which is given by
tB =
(1− α− β)(1− θ)λrL1
1 + (1− θ)λ+ (1− α− β)(1− θ)λrL1
(2.26)
tS =
(1− α− β)(1− θ)λ(rS1 − rL1 )
1 + (1− θ)λ+ (1− α− β)(1− θ)λrL1
(2.27)
evaluated at the competitive equilibrium. Another regulatory system that
restores efficiency involves taxes on both assets, and is given by:
tL =
(1− α− β)(1− θ)λrL1
1 + (1− θ)λ
(2.28)
tS =
(1− α− β)(1− θ)λrS1
1 + (1− θ)λ
(2.29)
also evaluated at the competitive equilibirum solution.
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2.3.2 Contrast with Recent Literature
The model is comparable, in terms of results, to recent models in the lit-
erature. Specifically, when land is removed from the model, and production only
requires seeders and workers, i.e. β = 0, the model yields results analogous to Loren-
zoni (2008). As in that model, at inefficient equilibria the economy would display
inefficient levels of external financing, or an inefficient credit boom, or overexposure
to liquidity risk, since all of them are equivalent. In the current version of the model
with two assets the equivalence is broken, and the model points to the general prob-
lem of overexposure to liquidity risk as being the source of concern. The exposure
to liquidity risk, in that sense, is analogous to the capacity of the banking system
to do new lending when funding shocks hit the economy.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
The model produces two implications that I test empirically. First, it high-
lights that the systemic exposure to the liquidity risk of banks is the key vulnerability
explaining the output collpase after an external financing shock. Second, the model
delivers unsually high external short-term debt, high growth of bank credit to GDP,
and high loans-to-deposits ratios at the same time the exposure to liquidity risk is
also unsually high. Recent literature finds strong support of the first three but the
model suggest that their empirical success might be explained by their capacity to
capture, at least partially, exposure to the liquidity risk of the banking system, when
not properly controlled for. My empirical results give support to these implications
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of the model.
The model defines that the exposure to the liquidity risk of banks is the key
vulnerability explaining the size of the output collapse. Following definitions from


















The ratio is evaluated at limθ→1 to produce a clean expression. Such limit is
capturing the notion that the probability of an external financing shock is small. The
last equality follows from the fact that S1z ∼= S1n − B0 given that the repayment
to households can be estimated to be small relative to S1n and B0. Therefore,
the capacity of the banking system to do new lending in crisis states, S1n − B0, is
the key factor explaining the size of output collapse (i.e. the exposure to liquidity
risk). Although in the model B0 represents external borrowing, when conducting
the empirical test it needs to be understood in a broad sense: it represents the
amount of liabilities that are redeemed in a liquidity crisis.
By extending a methodoly recently introduced by international banking reg-
ulators (BCBS 2009 and 2010), which captures liquidity risks at the bank level, I
design an index that captures the exposure at the system level. The index uses both
microdata and macrodata. Microdata (ie banks’ financial statements) is obtained
from the Bankscope database, which is the most comprehensive available source of
information on these matters. It accounts for banks with at least 90% of the as-
sets in each country, according to the source. Importantly, it provides an accounting
model, the universal bank model, that adjust for differences in accounting standards
32
across jurisdictions, making the information comparable. A caveat is that it does
not present a breakdown of assets and liabilities by currency. For that purpose I also
use macrodata on external and total liabilities of the consolidated banking system,
to account for the liquidity implications of differences in the currency composition.
I obtain this information from two sources: the Quarterly External Debt Statis-
tics database (QEDS), published by the World Bank (WB), and the International
Financial Statistics database (IFS), published by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The index is computed for a core sample and an extended sample, with a
maximum of 40 emerging markets and developing countries, and 1,700 banks. Ap-
pendix A explains the construction of the index (FPI) in detail and table B.1, in
appendix B, lists the samples.
The empirical excercise consists of testing the power of the FPI in explaining
output declines across emerging markets, after the Lehman’s bankruptcy. There is
a growing recent literature that intends to identify the vulnerabilties and character-
istics that best explain that heterogenity. My strategy is to test the FPI in the best
performing empirical frameworks identified by the literature. Blanchard et al (2010)
find that external short-term debt to GDP is the most significant robust variable
in explaining cross country output declines. The authors find that a trade vari-
able, which captures the output declines of the main trade partners, also matters,
although the relation is not as tight. In the analysis the authors do not break down
the external debt by sector. Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2010) find that the output de-
cline was larger in countries that experienced large pre-crisis net capital inflows and
fast credit growth. Berkmen et al (2009) find that the loans-to-deposits ratio of the
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banking system and the cumulative growth of bank credit explain a large share of
the variation in the forecast revision of output growth. Cecchetti et al (2011) argue
that economies featuring low private sector credit to GDP and little dependence on
the US for short-term funding were much less vulnerable to the Crisis.12
The core sample I work with consists of 27 emerging markets, across different
regions, and is taken from Blanchard et al (2010).13 To check the robustness of the
results, I construct an extended sample, which consists of 40 countries and includes
the 27 in the core sample and 13 additional countries. The criteria is to include every
economy classified as an emerging market or developing country by the following
analysts: the 20 countries in FTSE, the 21 countries in MSCI, the 19 countries
in the S&P, the 35 countries in Dow Jones, the 22 countries in the EIU and the
11 countries in the Next 11. In addition, I add the countries in the main sample
of Berkmen et al (2009). Given that countries overlap in the lists and that the
information required for the empirical analysis is not available for some of them,
the extended sample comprises 40 countries. Table B.1, in appendix B, lists the
countries in both samples.
The empirical specification I adopt follows recent literature and can be written
in regression form as







where η, δ and ψi are parameters, y
j is the measure of output growtht for
12Berkmen et al (2009), Blanchard et al (2010) and Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2010) use a sample
of emerging markets and developing countries. On the other hand, Cecchetti et al (2011) include
both developed countries and emerging markets in their sample.
13Blanchard et al (2010) have 29 countries. Some data is not publicly available for Taiwan and
Venezuela.
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country j, FPIj is the index of systemic exposure to liquidity risk for country j , xji
is the control variable i for country j and εj is an error term. The measure of out-
put decline yj refers to the unexpected output growth inmediately after Lehman’s
bankruptcy and is analogous to the one used in Blanchard et al (2010). It is mea-
sured as the forecast error for output growth bewteen the end of the third quarter
of 2008 (Q3.08) and the end of the second quarter of 2009 (Q2.09). The forecast of
output growth rates (i.e. expected) correspond to the ones produced in the April
2008 edition of the World Economic Outlook databased (WEO), published by IMF.
Actual output growth rates are taken from IFS. Unexpected output growth is defined
as the cumulative difference between the forecast and actual.
The set of controls includes four variables identified by recent literature as the
most relevant in explaining cross country output declines after Lehman collapse. The
set includes one control that captures trade-related channels and three controls that
captured finance-related channels. The trade-related control, unexpected partner















is the ratio of exports to GDP of country j at the end of 2007,
Φj is an adjustment factor, exji represents the exports of country j to country i at
the end of 2007, and yi is the measure of unexpected output growth for country
i as defined for the dependent variable. I obtain data on bilateral trade from the
Direction of Trade Statistics database (DTS), also published by the IMF, and data
on GDP from WEO.14
14The adjustment factor is required because data on unexpected output growth of trade partners
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The finance-related controls include three well-established indicators of vul-
nerability: (i) the ratio of external short-term debt to GDP, (ii) the growth of bank
credit to the private sector, as a fraction of GDP, and (iii) the loans-to-deposits
ratio of the banking system. External short-term debt to GDP is defined on a re-
maining maturity basis and is measured at the end of 2007. I obtain this ratio from
WEO. The growth of bank credit to the private sector is measured as the difference
between credit to the private sector to GDP at the end of 2007 and at the end of
2003. I obtain this data from the World Development Indicators database (WDI)
published by WB. The loans-to-deposits ratio corresponds to total bank credit over
resident deposits and is measured at the end of 2007. The data is obtained from
IFS. Table B.2, in appendix B, presents the summary statistics for the countries in
both samples.
Table 1 presents the results for the core sample and table B.3, in appendix
B, presents the results for the extended sample. There are two points to take from
them. First, the first column of both tables shows that a simple regression of the
FPI, the trade variable and a constant, achieves an R-squared of 63% in the core
sample and 47% in the extended sample. In addition, the FPI is highly significant in
both samples. Given the size of both samples this result seems meritful. Although
the R-squared is smaller in the extended sample, the coefficient on the FPI is larger
(0.33 versus 0.29) and coefficient on the trade variable is smaller (0.74 versus 1.03).
In the core the sample, the coefficient of 0.29 means that for an additional point
is not available for all the partners. The variable accounts for partners that represent, at least,






of new credit that the banking system could do in crisis, measured as percentage
of GDP, output is forecasted to grow 0.29% in the three quarters after Lehman’s
bankruptcy (on an annualized basis). Overal, the index seems a robust explana-
tor of unexpected output declines across emerging markets, giving support to the
prediction that exposure to liquidity risks of the banking system is a relevant mea-
sure of vulnerability of a country to abrupt negative changes in external financing
conditions.
In the second place, the explanatory power of the aggregate indicators of
vulnerability (i), (ii) and (iii), as specified above, is considerably reduced after con-
trolling for the FPI. In the core sample, the statistical significance of the three of
them vanishes completely. This result is evident when comparing column 2 with 5,
3 with 6, and 4 with 7. As an example, the coefficient in external short-term debt is
-0.27 in the core sample, when the FPI is not included, and is statistically significant
at 1% of confidence. Howerver, its significance dissapears when controlling for the
FPI. The coefficient is almot half, and is not statistically significant even at 10%
confidence. This behavior is also shared by (ii) growth of bank credit and by (iii)
the loans-to-deposits ratio. In the extended sample the change in significance is less
dramatic, but still relevant. As an example, the coefficient on external short-term
debt changes from -0.26 to -0.13, and changes from being significant at 1% to being
significant at 10% confidence. The same is true for (ii) and (iii). Overall these
findings suggest that their previous success reflects, at least partially, the ability of
(i), (ii) and (iii) to capture the exposure to liquidity risk of the banking system.
Section A.2, in appendix A, shows that these indicators are correlated with the FPI
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and formulates hypothesis on why that should be the case. Table B.2, in appendix
B, presents the results for the extended sample.
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Table 1. Unexpected Output Growth After Lehman’s Bankruptcy in Emerging
Markets
(dependent variable: projected minus actual growth from Q3.08 to Q2.09, saar)
Regressor
Unexpected Partner Growth 1.03∗∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
FPI 0.29∗∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.25∗∗
External Short-Term Debt -0.27∗∗∗ -0.13
Growth of Bank Credit -0.21∗∗∗ -0.09
Loans to Deposits -0.09∗∗∗ -0.02
Constant -6.46∗∗∗ -2.88 -2.41 4.89 -5.17∗ -5.18∗ -3.63
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
R-sq 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.54 0.66 0.65 0.64
1Robust standard errors,∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
2Forecasetd minus actual GDP growth of trade partners (Q3.08 vs Q2.09, saar), weighted by trade
and multiplied by home export share of nominal GDP in 2007.
3External short-term debt, on a remaining maturity basis, as a percentage of GDP, end of 2007.
4Bank credit to the private sector as a percetage of GDP, end of 2007 minus end of 2003.
5Total bank claims over deposits in depositary corporations other than Central Banks.
2.5 Conclusions
The debate on why and how large capital inflows into the banking system
should be contained has been with us for some decades. The debate recently shifted
towards the area of prudential regulation, which is based on the premise that banks
seem prone to create systemic financial risk. In emerging markets, policymakers
view with great concern situations where all the banks in the system have a common
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source of exposure: an external financing shock. This paper develops a framework
that shows that such exposure can be excessive under some circumstances. The
undervaluation of insurance by banks leads to distortions in the type of credit they
extend. Such distortions need to be addressed to improve economic outcomes. In
particular, the model shows that banks tend to choose excessive short-term credit
since it hedges better the risks of the external financing. In this sense the model gives
support to the perception that, in time of large inflows to the banking system, the
economy relies excessively on short-term credit (as consumption credit) rather that
on long-term credit to long-term investment projects. Under those circumstances,
the policy prescription of the government of Brazil in April 2011 seems sensible.
Both the model and the empirical evidence deliver a clear message: The real
concern is the continuous ability of the banking system in extending credit to the
economy (i.e. the systemic exposure to liquidity risk of banks). In this framework
of thinking, traditional concerns of ”overborrowing” or ”inefficient booms in credit”
seem to be explained, at least partially, by the concerns relevant to systemic expo-
sure to liquidity risk. As I showed in the model, in situations of excessive exposure
to liquidity risk, policies design to limiting the amount of external borrowing, or
capping the growth in credit, are not sufficient neither necessary to solve the prob-
lem. The problem requires not only addressing the size of banks’ balance sheet, but
its structure. It demands understanding, and taking into account in the formulation
of policies, the liquidity characteristics of different types of assets and liabilities. Ef-
forts in this direction are warranted given that the costs of an inefficient regulatory
framework are not small in these economies that arguably lack capital investments.
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At the same time this paper also provides a warning to policymakers. In an
emerging market, where capital is usually imported to finance domestic investment
oportunities, some degree of financial fragility is optimal. The model shows that
there are equilibria where the benefits of increased investments is worth the liquidity
risk. Setting the objective only in terms of reducing volatility, without taking into
account the benefits of increased investment, seems inappropriate. On the other
hand, the welfare analysis provides a rationale for a (macro)prudential approach.
In a framework where banks face constraints to obtain the liquidity they need from
other sectors of the economy, banks may underestimate the damage associated with
a limited capacity to extend new credit if an aggregate financing shock comes.
The microfoundation of the financial constraint can be obtained from a limited
commitment problem bewteen banks and households, as in Lorenzoni (2008). How-
ever, the constraint could also be undertood as arising from a central bank that has
limited capacity to assist the banking system in times of crisis. This could be due to
limited credibility on the institution. The fact that the liabilities of the government
(both bonds and bills) are in high supply by the private sector in a liquidity crisis is
a key factor distinguing emerging markets from developed countries. This requires
an explicit model of the central bank and remains a topic for future research. Once
such a framework is developed, it should be possible to evaluate macroprudential
policies in conjunction with monetary policy, and even their complementarities with
international reserves.
The model presented shows that excessive exposure to liquidity risk is a possi-
bility. However, there are some equilibria where the gains of receiving large capital
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inflows compensate the risk. Therefore, the presence and severity of overexposure
to liquidity risk becomes an empirical issue. This provides arguments to develop
better metrics to monitor this risk. Recent advances include the methodology pro-
vided by BCBS. I show that this methodology can be extended to capture exposure
at the system level. Although the index I develop performs well in cross-country
regressions around Lehman’s bankruptcy, further tests are required to understand
its validity. Despite the fact that my methodology does not provide a threshold
value at which the exposure changes from acceptable to excessive, it allows to iden-
tify countries that are highly exposed. As an example, at the end of 2007 the index
captured that, had a funding shock taken place, the banking system of Latvia and
Estonia would have been not only unable to extend any new credit, but would have
also needed to sell loans for a value of 30% and 20% of GDP to honor its liabilities.
In the three quarters after Lehman’s bankruptcy, their output collapsed around 25%
on an annualized basis.
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Chapter 3
Bank Funding Structure and Risk: Evidence from the Global
Financial Crisis
3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis raised questions on the adequacy of bank risk man-
agement practices and triggered a deep revision of the regulatory and supervisory
frameworks governing bank liquidity risk and capital buffers. Regulatory initiatives
at the international level included, inter alia, the introduction of liquidity standards
for internationally-active banks, binding leverage ratios, and a revision of capital
requirements under Basel III (BCBS 2009; and BCBS 2010 a, b). 1 In addition to
these micro-prudential measures, academics and policymakers argued for the intro-
duction of a complementary macro-prudential framework to help safeguard financial
stability at the systemic level (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2010).
This regulatory response was implicitly based on two premises. First, the view
that individual bank decisions regarding the size of their liquidity and capital buffers
in the run up to the crisis were not commensurate with their risk-taking-and were
therefore suboptimal from the social perspective. Second, the perception that the
costs of bank failures spanned beyond the interests of their direct stakeholders due,
1On liquidity, the proposals comprise two prudential ratios that entail minimum binding stan-
dards: a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), aimed at promoting banks’ resilience to liquidity risk
over the short-term (a 30-day period); and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), aimed at pro-
moting resilience over a one-year horizon. In addition, a leverage ratio computed as shareholders’
capital over total assets was introduced to ensure a hard minimum capital level, regardless of the
structure of risk-weights in bank balance sheets.
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for example, to supply-side effects in credit markets, or network externalities in the
financial sector (Brunnermeier, 2009).
The widespread bank failures in the U.S. and Europe at the peak of the global
financial crisis provided casual support to the first premise. Still, empirical work
on the connection between bank liquidity and capital buffers and their subsequent
probability of failure is incipient. Background studies carried out in the context
of Basel III proposals, which are based on aggregate data, concluded that stricter
regulations on liquidity and leverage were likely to ameliorate the probability of
systemic banking crises (BCBS, 2010b).2 In turn, studies based on micro data for
U.S. banks also support the notion that banks with higher asset liquidity, stronger
reliance on retail insured deposits, and larger capital buffers were less vulnerable
to failure during the global financial crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2010; Bologna,
2011). Broadly consistent results are reported in Ratnovski and Huang (2009), based
on data for large banks from the OECD.
This paper makes two contributions to previous work. First, it measures struc-
tural liquidity and leverage in bank balance sheets in a way consistent with the
formulations of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), and the leverage ratio (EQ-
UITY) proposed in Basel III. Second, it explores for systematic differences in the
relationship between structural liquidity, leverage, and subsequent probability of fail-
ure across bank types. In particular, we distinguish between large, internationally-
active banks (henceforth Global banks), and (typically smaller) banks that focus on
2This work also found evidence of non-linear effects at play, as the estimated marginal benefits
of stricter regulations seemed to drop with the size of the liquidity and capital buffers.
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their domestic retail markets (henceforth Domestic banks).
This sample partition is suitable from the financial stability perspective. Global
banks are systemically important and extremely challenging to resolve, due to the
complexity of their business and legal structures, and because their operations span
across borders, entailing differences in bank insolvency frameworks and difficult fis-
cal considerations. Furthermore, the relative role of liquidity and capital buffers
for bank financial soundness is likely to differ systematically across these two types
of banks. All else equal, Global banks benefit from the imperfect co-movement
macroeconomic and monetary conditions across geographic regions (Griffith-Jones,
Segoviano, and Spratt, 2002; Garcia-Herrero and Vazquez, 2007) and may exploit
their internal capital markets to reshuffle liquidity and capital between business
units. In addition, Global banks tend to enjoy a more stable funding base than Do-
mestic banks due to flight to safety, particularly during times of market distress. To
the extent that these factors are incorporated in bank risk management decisions,
optimal choices on structural liquidity and leverage are likely to differ across these
two types of banks.
The paper exploits a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 U.S. and
European banks during 2001?09. This sample coverage allows us to study bank
dynamics leading to, and during, the global financial crisis. As a by-product, we
document the evolution of structural liquidity and leverage in the pre-crisis period,
and highlight some patterns across bank types to motivate further research. Con-
trary to expectations, the average structural liquidity in bank balance sheets in the
run up to the global financial crisis (as measured by a proxy of the NSFR) was
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close to the target values proposed in Basel III recommendations. 3 However, we
find a wide dispersion in structural liquidity across banks. A mild (albeit sustained)
increase in structural liquidity mismatches in the run up to the crisis was driven
by banks located at the lower extreme of the distribution. Pre-crisis leverage was
also widely uneven across banks, with the Global banks displaying thinner capital
buffers and wider gaps between leverage ratios and Basel capital to risk-weighted
assets.
In line with alleged deficiencies in bank risk management practices, we find
that banks with weaker structural liquidity and banks with higher leverage ratios
in the run up to the crisis were more vulnerable to failure, after controlling for their
pre-crisis risk-taking. However, the average effects of stronger structural liquidity
and capital buffers on the likelihood of bank failure are not large. On the other hand,
there is evidence of substantial threshold effects, and the benefits of stronger buffers
appear substantial for the banks located at the lower extremes of the distributions.
In addition, we find systematic differences in the relative importance of liquidity
and leverage for financial fragility across groups of banks. Global banks were more
susceptible to failure on excessive leverage, while Domestic banks were more suscep-
tible to failure on weak structural liquidity (i.e., excessive liquidity transformation)
and overreliance on short-term wholesale funding.
In the estimations, we include bank-level controls for pre-crisis risk taking,
and for country-specific macroeconomic conditions (i.e., common to all banks incor-
3Structural liquidity was measured by the ratio of long-term stable funding sources to structural
asset positions.
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porated in a given country). The use of controls for pre-crisis risk-taking is critical
to this study. To the extent that banks perform active risk management, higher
risk-taking would tend to be associated with stronger liquidity and capital buffers,
introducing a bias to the results. In fact, we find that banks engaging in more ag-
gressive risk taking in the run-up to the crisis-as measured by the rate of growth
of their credit portfolios and by their pre-crisis distance to default-were more likely
to fail afterward. Macroeconomic conditions in the pre-crisis period are also found
to affect bank probabilities of default, suggesting that banks may have failed to
internalize risks stemming from overheated economic activity and exuberant asset
prices.
All in all, these results provide support to the proposed regulations on liquidity
and capital, as well as to the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to bank
regulation. From the financial stability perspective, however, the evidence indicates
that regulations on capital-particularly for the larger banking groups-are likely to
be more relevant.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section II places the paper in the
context of the literature. Section III presents the dataset, discusses the criteria for
the partition of the sample, and describes some stylized facts on the evolution of
liquidity and leverage across groups of banks. Section IV describes the quantitative
results of baseline regressions and a parallel set of exercises with alternative parti-
tions of the sample to assess the extent of cross-sectional differences and non-linear
effects. Section V presents various robustness checks. Section VI concludes. All the
tables and figures referred in this chapter can be found in Appendix C.
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3.2 Related Literature and Empirical Hypothesis
The theory of financial intermediation shows that liquidity creation is an es-
sential role of banks and establishes a strong connection between liquidity creation
and financial stability (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Banks create
liquidity on both sides of their balance sheets, by financing long-term projects with
relatively liquid liabilities such as transaction deposits and short-term funding. 4
The associated exposure to liquidity risk is an intrinsic characteristic of banks that
operates as a discipline device and supports efficiency in financial intermediation
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000). In this set up, bank capital (i.e., lower leverage) en-
tails a cost in terms of liquidity creation but provides a buffer against changes in the
value of bank assets, increasing bank survival probabilities under distressed market
conditions (Diamond and Rajan 2001).
The notion of bank liquidity creation in the literature is closely related with
the regulatory concept of structural liquidity mismatches in bank balance sheets.
The latter reflects the portion of long-term, illiquid assets (i.e., structural positions)
that are financed with short-term funding and non-core deposits. Thus, a bank with
larger structural liquidity mismatches would create more liquidity. Bank liquidity
creation is also related with the leverage ratio, which measures equity capital relative
to total assets. To the extent that (the book value of) equity entails a stable funding
component, a bank with a higher leverage ratio would also create more liquidity.
The role of bank liquidity in the global financial crisis has been subject to
4Banks can also create liquidity via off-balance sheet operations, for example, by issuing com-
mitments and guarantees (see for example Kayshap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002).
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substantial attention. In particular, the reliance of banks on short-term wholesale
funding to finance the expansion of their balance sheets in the run-up to the crisis,
together with excessive leverage, have been highlighted as key factors in the buildup
of systemic risks and the propagation mechanism. 5 Empirical studies show that
banking crises in the U.S. have been preceded by periods of abnormal liquidity
creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2008, 2009). There is also evidence that banks’
reliance on wholesale funding had a negative effect on the performance of their stock
prices after the outbreak of the crisis (Raddatz, 2010) and resulted in increased
financial fragility, as measured by distance to default and the volatility of bank
stock returns (Demirg-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009), or by the likelihood of receiving
public assistance (Ratnovski and Huang, 2009). In addition, U.S. banks with more
stable funding structures continued to lend relative to other banks during the global
financial crisis (Cornett et al., 2010), and were less likely to fail (Bologna, 2011).
A related strand of literature has focused on the role of capital in the capacity
of banks to withstand financial crises. The evidence indicates that banks with
larger capital cushions fared better during the global financial crisis in terms of
stock returns (Demirg-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche, 2010). Related work by
Berger and Bouwman (2010) analyzed the survival probabilities of banks in the U.S.
during two banking crises and three market-related crises (i.e., those originated by
5From the theoretical point of view, however, there are competing views on the effects of bank
reliance on wholesale funding on their vulnerability to liquidity risk as well as on market discipline.
On the one hand, sophisticated institutional investors may exercise stronger monitoring, enhancing
market discipline and offering an alternative to offset unexpected deposit withdrawals (Calomiris,
1999). On the other, in an environment of costless but noisy public signals, short-term wholesale
financiers may face lower incentives to monitor, choosing to withdraw in response to negative
public signals and triggering inefficient liquidations (Huang and Ratnovski, 2010).
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events in the capital markets), and concluded that small banks with higher capital
were more likely to survive both types of crises. In contrast, higher capital cushions
improved the survival probabilities of medium-size and large banks only during
banking crises. Previous studies based on bank-level data also showed that capital
ratios had a strong informative content in explaining subsequent bank failure and
pointed to the presence of non-linear effects (Estrella, Park, and Peristaki, 2000;
Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer, 2007).
The combined role of structural liquidity and capital cushions on bank fragility
was addressed in the context of Basel III proposals (BCBS, 2010). This work con-
cluded that stronger capital buffers were associated with lower probability of banking
crises and also with less severe costs. Evidence on the role of liquidity buffers was
somewhat less conclusive possibly due to data limitations, since the analysis was
based on aggregate data.
In this paper, we use a bank-level dataset to study the connection between
structural liquidity and leverage in bank balance sheets in the run-up to the global
financial crisis, and the likelihood of subsequent failure. We also explore for po-
tential differences in the relative importance of liquidity and capital buffers on the
likelihood of failure across bank types, distinguishing between large globally-active
banks, and domestic retail-oriented institutions. In particular, we try to answer
the following questions: (i) are there any connections between structural liquidity
and leverage in bank balance sheets during the pre-crisis period and the probability
of subsequent failure? (ii) is there evidence of systematic differences across bank
types? In answering these questions, we also explore the relationship between bank
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risk-taking and macroeconomic and financial factors in the run up to the crisis and
the likelihood of subsequent bank failure.
To guide the analysis, we build upon the theories mentioned above, which
imply a direct connection between structural liquidity mismatches in bank balance
sheets, leverage, and financial fragility. We note, however, that active implementa-
tion of risk management and controls by banks may tend to weaken, or even com-
pletely dissipate, this connection. In fact, under the hypothesis that bank decisions
regarding their risk-taking and the size of the associated liquidity and capital buffers
were optimal, we should find a positive relationship between pre-crisis risk-taking
and the size of liquidity and capital buffers, but a weak connection whatsoever be-
tween the latter and the probability of failure. Following the same reasoning, proper
risk-taking and management by banks would tend to weaken the connections be-
tween the macroeconomic environment in the run-up to the crisis and the likelihood
of subsequent bank failure. These hypotheses are taken to the data in the next
sections.
3.3 Data and Target Variables
We obtain bank-level financial statements from the Bankscope database. Using
this source has two major advantages. First, the coverage is fairly comprehensive,
with sampled banks accounting for about 90 percent of total assets in each country,
according to the source. Second, the information at the bank level is presented
in standardized formats, after adjusting for differences in accounting and reporting
standards across countries. On the other hand, the use of publicly available data has
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some limitations, in particular the lack of sufficient granularity in some of the balance
sheet accounts. For example, detailed breakdown of loan portfolios by categories,
maturity, or currency, is not generally available. Similarly, securities portfolios are
not segregated by asset classes, or by maturity. On the other hand, relatively richer
information is available on the liabilities’ side, as deposits are classified by type, and
non-deposit funding is classified in short-term (i.e., residual maturity shorter than
one year) versus long-term (i.e., residual maturity longer than one year).
The sample covers about 11,000 banks incorporated in the U.S. and Europe,
which were the regions more severely affected by the global financial crisis. Series
are yearly, spanning 2001-09. Therefore, we are able to capture the evolution of
bank financial conditions in the run up to the crisis (2001-07) as well as throughout
the crisis (2008-09). For the purpose of the analysis, we split the sample according
to two alternative criteria. First, we distinguish between large internationally active
banks versus domestically-oriented banks, and further split the latter in commercial
banks, savings banks, and cooperatives. In parallel, we split the sample by target
levels of structural liquidity and leverage to explore for potential threshold effects.
Balance sheets and income statements are taken in U.S. dollar terms, using
the market rate at the closing dates of the bank-specific accounting exercises. While
in many cases Bankscope reports both consolidated and unconsolidated financial
statements, we use consolidated figures to the extent possible, to reflect the overall
liquidity and leverage positions of individual banking groups. Outliers are identified
and removed by filtering-out observations with either liquidity or leverage below the
0.5 percentile and above the 99.5 percentile.
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3.3.1 Indicators of Bank Liquidity and Leverage
To measure structural liquidity and leverage, we use two novel international
regulatory standards: the Net Stable Funding Ratio, NSFR, and the leverage ra-
tio, measured by dividing equity capital to assets, EQUITY, (BCBS, 2009, 2010).
The NSFR reflects the proportion of long-term illiquid assets that are funded with
liabilities that are either long-term or deemed to be stable (such as core deposits).
In turn, EQUITY reflects the proportion of shareholders’ equity to assets and thus
provides a measure of bank leverage. All else equal, a higher NSFR and a higher
EQUITY imply lower bank liquidity creation.
Specifically, the NSFR is a ratio between the weighted sum of various types of








The weights w are bounded between zero and one, but do not add up to one.
They reflect the relative stability of balance sheet components. In the case of assets,
larger weights are assigned to less liquid positions. In the case of liabilities, larger
weights are assigned to more stable sources of funding. A higher NSFR is therefore
associated with lower liquidity risk. The proposed regulations require banks to
maintain a NSFR higher than one.
As noted above, the granularity of bank assets and liabilities required to repli-
cate the NSFR is not publicly available. However, we can still approximate the ratio
reasonably well using Bankscope data. A stylized bank balance sheet, together with
53
the weights used in the calculation of the NSFR, is presented in Figure 4. Some
departures from the NSFR proposed in Basel III are worth noting. First, we cannot
split the loan portfolios according to their type or residual maturity, which under
Basel III entail different weights (ranging from 0.50 to 1.00). Following a conserva-
tive approach, we assume that the total loan portfolio requires stable funding and
use an overall weight of 1.00. For other earning assets, which tend to be more liquid,
we use an average weight of 0.35, which is within the range proposed in Basel III.
Fixed assets and non-earning assets (except for cash and due from banks) receive a
weight of 1.00, also following conservative criteria. On the liabilities side, we split
customer deposits by type and other liabilities according to their maturity. The
weights assigned reflect the assumption that core retail deposits are more stable
than other short-term funding sources. Accordingly, the latter are given a weight
of zero. Long-term liabilities and equity are considered to be stable at the one-year
horizon.
As for leverage, we use the ratio between shareholder’s equity to assets, which
is broadly used and in line with Basel III proposals.
Robustness checks are performed using alternative indicators of bank liquidity
and leverage. For liquidity, we use the Short Term Funding Ratio (STFR), mea-
sured by dividing the liabilities maturing within one-year over total liabilities. For
capitalization we use the Basel CAR definition, measured by the ratio of regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets.
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3.3.2 Global Banks versus Domestic Banks
As noted before, we classify banks in two categories, namely Global banks
and Domestic banks, using information on their size, geographic presence, and own-
ership. The group of Global banks encompasses internationally-active institutions
with consolidated assets surpassing US dollares 10 billion at end-2009. To select
only the parent banking groups, we identify banks owing majority stakes in foreign
subsidiaries, with no financial institutions listed as their ultimate owners. In turn,
the group of Domestic banks encompasses domestically-owned institutions with no
majority stakes in subsidiaries abroad. The coverage of the sample is uneven (Table
1). For Domestic banks, it tracks 10,805 institutions during 2001-09, with more than
8 years of time coverage for about 57 percent of the banks in the sub-sample. As for
Global banks, the sample covers 91 institutions, with more than 6 years of informa-
tion for 60 percent of the banks in the sub-sample. Looking closely into the data,
there is apparent break in the subsample of European banks in 2005, which is mainly
attributable to changes in the accounting information after the adoption of IFRS.
We check for potential noise associated with this break by computing the pre-crisis
variables according to three alternative criteria: (i) computing their means over the
entire available data for each bank; (ii) computing their means over 2004-07; and
(iii) using their values as of end-2007. Not surprisingly, since the target variables
are stocks, the results obtained under these three criteria are broadly consistent.
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3.3.3 Bank Failure
We identify the group of banks that failed during the crisis by using several
complementary sources. First, we exploit the information on the ongoing status of
each bank contained in BankScope, and single out the banks that changed status
from ”active” to either: ”under receivership”, ”bankruptcy”, ”dissolved”, ”dissolved
by merger”, or ”in liquidation”. Second, we track the evolution of the Basel capital
(CAR) for each bank and single out the banks with CAR dropping below the 8
percent threshold between 2008?09. Third, we exploit information on Moody’s bank
financial strength ratings and single out banks downgraded to ratings E+ or E (in
distress). These criteria are useful to identify the banks that were allowed to fail and
subject to resolution procedures, which were typically the smaller non-systemically
important institutions. On the other hand, the failing Global banks were generally
assisted by their governments and therefore not properly captured by these criteria.
To deal with this issue, we use the information on failing banks from Laeven and
Valencia (2010). 6
3.4 Empirical Approach and Quantitative Results
To gauge the relationship between bank structural liquidity, leverage, and their
subsequent probability of failure, we compute a probit model exploiting the cross-
sectional distribution of bank-level state variables prior to the crisis. In particular,
6The authors provide a summary of the most relevant banks that failed, or were assisted by
their home governments during the global financial crisis, starting from end-2007. This captures
banks that received direct assistance from the government (equity injections, bond purchases) as
opposed to indirect assistance (general asset purchase programs, reductions in discount rates, and
other support measures).
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we formulate the empirical model:
Pr (Fi = 1 | xi) = Φ (xiβ) (3.2)
Where Fi is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank i failed during
the crisis (i.e., between 2008-09) and zero otherwise. The vector Xi contains the two
target variables, namely, the NSFR and the EQUITY ratio, both measured prior to
the crisis. The vector also contains a set of bank-level controls, aimed at capturing
differences in bank risk profiles in the run-up to the crisis. These include: (i) the
yearly average of credit growth, CREDIT GROWTH, (ii) the ratio of non-interest
income to total income, NON-INTEREST INCOME, and (iii) the distance to default
or Z-SCORE, which conveys the number of standard deviations that bank return
on assets has to drop to trigger insolvency. The inclusion of non-interest income
follows from the conjecture that bank risk profiles increased with their reliance on
trading or investment banking activities in the run up to the crisis (Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga, 2009). The vector also contains two country-specific variables (i.e.,
common to the banks incorporated in a given country) which are aimed at capturing
macroeconomic and monetary conditions in the run-up to the crisis. These are the
yearly average rate of GDP growth, GDP GROWTH, and the MONEY MARKET
RATES. The use of pre-crisis averages for the explanatory variables ameliorates
potential endogeneity problems, which comes at the cost of neglecting dynamics
along the time dimension. Thus, the specification is purely cross-sectional and does
not include bank-level fixed effects.
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As noted before, under the premise that banks manage their liquidity and cap-
italization in a sound way, one should expect to find a positive correlation between
their ex-ante risk taking and their capital and liquidity ratios, and a weak connec-
tion whatsoever between these and their probabilities of failure. Evidence on the
contrary would indicate that banks failed to properly account for their risk taking
in the run-up to the crisis, providing some ground for a more intrusive prudential
framework regarding capital and liquidity buffers. Following a similar argument,
macroeconomic conditions should not play a systematic role in the probabilities of
failure of well-managed banks. Evidence on the contrary would imply a link be-
tween macroeconomic conditions and systemic financial stability (since the former
are common to all banks incorporated in a given country), providing ground for a
complementary macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.
3.4.1 Stylized Facts
Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2, splitting the
sample across Global and Domestic banks. The magnitude of the difference in
size between these two groups of banks is striking. The average balance sheet of
the Domestic banks was US dollars 0.7 billion at end-2009, compared with US
dollars 527.1 billion for Global banks, and the institution in the 99 percentile of
the distribution had a balance sheet of US dollars 2.9 trillion at end-2009. The
massive size of these banks makes them extremely challenging to resolve, and their
interconnectedness and financial complexity compounds with the breath of their
operations, which span across borders.
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Some additional differences between Global and Domestic banks are worth
noting. In the pre-crisis period, Global banks displayed thinner capital cushions
than Domestic banks, and weaker indicators of structural liquidity. The structure
of Global bank liabilities was also more heavily reliant on non-deposit funding,
and tilted to the short-term. The statistics also uncover a wide difference between
EQUITY and the Basel CAR, which is mainly attributable to the effect of risk-
weighs in the Basel formula. Furthermore, the gap between these two measures is
larger for Global banks suggesting a negative relationship between bank size and
average risk-weights. For example, Global banks in the first percentile have an
EQUITY ratio of only 1.4 percent compared to a Basel CAR of 9.2 percent, which
is 6.6 times higher. In turn, Domestic banks have an EQUITY ratio of 2.5 and a
Basel CAR of 10.1 percent, which is 4.0 times higher. Other risk indicators, such as
the Z-score and credit growth are broadly similar across bank types.
To explore the relationship between the target variables in the pre-crisis period,
pair-wise correlations are presented in Table 3. As before, we split the sample
between Global banks (lower triangle) and Domestic banks (upper triangle) to gauge
the extent of potential cross-sectional differences. Not surprisingly, various measures
of liquidity tend to be closely related for both types of banks. For example, stronger
structural liquidity is associated with lower reliance on short-term funding (and with
money market funding) and positively correlated with deposit funding. Also, the two
measures of bank capital seem to convey similar information, despite gaps stemming
from risk weights. It is worth noting that the correlation between bank capital and
credit growth is positive and statistically significant in both subsamples. This is
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consistent with the idea that bank governance and risk management mechanisms
were at play (i.e., a more aggressive credit expansion was associated with stronger
capital cushions). On the other hand, some differences between the two bank types
are apparent. In the case of Global banks, higher structural liquidity seems to be
associated with more moderate credit growth and a larger distance to default. In the
case of Domestic banks, the relationship between these variables is not significant.
All in all, these correlations suggest that the expansion of bank balance sheets in
the pre-crisis period was associated with riskier liquidity profiles, particularly for
Global banks, but do not suggest an immediate connection with potential shortages
in capital buffers. The next section explores the link between bank probability of
failure with their pre-crisis levels of liquidity and capital in a more rigorous way.
To gauge the time evolution of structural liquidity and leverage across bank
types, Figure 1 plots the respective medians together with the 10th and 90th per-
centiles. Interestingly, the average NSFR before the crisis is relatively stable and
close to one. However, there is a wide dispersion across banks, with those located at
the lower extreme of the distribution displaying extremely weak structural liquidity.
A similar picture emerges for EQUITY capital. While the average bank displayed
relatively comfortable equity to asset ratios, those located at the low end of the
distribution were extremely leveraged.
A complementary diagram of the evolution of structural liquidity during the
sampled period is presented in Figure 2, splitting the sample by bank types and
across Failed and Non-Failed banks. The plots reveal interesting cross-sectional
patterns. As expected, the failed banks had lower structural liquidity and higher
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leverage than the non-failed banks. Furthermore, the NSFR follows a declining
trend in the pre-crisis period, which reverts from 2007 for the Domestic banks, and
from 2008 for the Global banks. In the latter group, there is a sudden drop at the
peak of the crisis, followed by an equally sharp increase that reflects the hoarding of
liquidity for precautionary purposes. Regarding EQUITY, Domestic banks display
more comfortable cushions than Global banks and an upward trend in the pre-
crisis period. After the eruption of the crisis, equity collapses in the group of failed
Domestic banks, but increases in the group of failed Global banks, reflecting capital
injections and public support due to their systemic importance.
Before turning to the regression analysis, we compare the distributions of pre-
crisis structural liquidity and leverage across Failed and Non-Failed banks, further
distinguishing between bank types (Figure 3). To facilitate the reading, we exclude
banks with NSFR above 1.5 and banks with EQUITY above 20 percent. All the
distributions have positive skewness and excess kurtosis, with normality tests re-
jecting the null in all cases. Comparing across subsamples, the most striking result
is the evidence of substantially lower EQUITY in the case of Failed Global banks,
with the mean close to 4 percent. The distributions of NSFR for Failed banks are
also displaced to the left, but the differences tend to be lower. In fact, tests of
differences of means (not shown) suggest that insufficient EQUITY was associated
with failure in the case of Global banks while insufficient structural liquidity was
a problem associated with the Domestic banks. In the next section we develop a
empirical model to formally test these conjectures.
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3.4.2 Baseline Regressions
The results of baseline probit regressions, properly transformed around the
mean of the explanatory variables to show the change in the probability of failure
associated with a change in the explanatory variables, support the notion that banks
with higher NSFR and EQUITY in the years before the crisis were less susceptible
to fail during the turmoil (Table 4). The coefficients associated to the two target
variables are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level in all cases
and the results are robust to the inclusion of the control variables. At the same time,
the evidence indicates that banks with higher risk taking in the pre-crisis period were
more likely to fail afterward. In particular, credit growth is positively associated
with the probability of failure, while the Z-score (i.e., distance to default) operates in
the opposite direction. On the other hand, the ratio of non-interest income to total
income is not statistically significant. The latter result contrasts with Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010), which is likely due to differences in the construction of
the variable. 7 Interestingly, the macroeconomic variables (which are common to all
banks incorporated in a given country) are also highly significant and operate in the
expected direction. Banks incorporated in countries with higher pre-crisis economic
growth and with easier monetary conditions were more likely to fail during the
crisis. This is consistent with the notion that banks failed to fully internalize risks
stemming from their external environment. This may provide justification for the
7This paper measures NON-INTEREST INCOME by taking the absolute value of non-interest
income to total income, to account for the fact that trading income may take negative values.
Therefore, a bank with either large non-interest gains or losses relative to total income is assumed
to be riskier.
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implementation of macro-prudential regulations as a complement to the traditional
micro-prudential approach. At the same time, it is also worth noting that the pseudo
R-square of the regression tends to be low, with the model explaining less than five
percent of the variation in bank probability of failure.
To assess the economic significance of the results, we take the regression coeffi-
cients presented in column (6) and compute the estimated change in the probability
of failure resulting from a 0.5 standard deviation change in the explanatory vari-
ables. The results (Table 5) indicate that a 10.4 percentage point increase in the
NSFR, from 0.99 to 1.09, would cause a drop 0.46 percentage point drop in the
probability of failure of the average bank, all else equal. Similarly, a 3.1 percentage
point increase in EQUITY, from 10.7 percent to 13.8 percent would cause a drop
of 0.64 percentage point drop in bank probability of failure. Thus, the quantitative
importance of these effects appears to be small, which is consistent with the results
obtained in quantitative impact studies (BCBS, 2010). A caveat of this interpreta-
tion is the potential presence of either non-linear or threshold effects operating more
severely for banks in the extremes of the distribution. This possibility is assessed in
the next section.
Turning back to the results, the probability of failure seems to be relatively
more influenced by bank risk profiles, particularly as reflected in the pre-crisis Z-
score, and by bank’s operating environments. Notably, banks incorporated in coun-
tries with a pre-crisis GDP growth 0.5 percentage points higher than the average
were 2.2 percentage points more likely to fail, while tighter monetary conditions
operated in the opposite direction. This is consistent with the presence of unsus-
63
tainable economic activity and/or potential asset bubbles in the pre-crisis period.
3.4.3 Are There Threshold Effects at Play?
To gauge the extent of threshold effects, we split the sample according to
pre-crisis values of NSFR and EQUITY with the help of dummy variables. 8 In
particular, we indentify banks with a NSFR below one and banks with EQUITY
below seven. These values are relevant references from the regulatory perspective.
We then re-estimate the regressions over each subsample and their combinations. As
before, the estimated coefficients are transformed to convey the marginal impact of
each explanatory variable on the probabilities of bank failure (Table 6). Overall, the
results are consistent with the idea that liquidity and capital play a complementary
role in financial stability and that threshold effects are at play. In the leftmost three
columns, which are computed over the subsamples of banks with weak structural
liquidity, the coefficients associated with EQUITY are two and four times higher
than those obtained in the matching baseline regressions. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between structural liquidity and the probability of failure reverses sign and
becomes statistically insignificant for the subsample of banks with low liquidity and
capital, indicating that capital shortages were critical for the failing banks in this
subsample.
Going back to results, the rightmost three columns display a partition of the
sample by levels of EQUITY. Not surprisingly, the strongest marginal benefits of
capital cushions originate from the subsample of banks operating below the seven
8We also computed a set of regressions including squared values of the NSFR and EQUITY to
allow for non-linear effects, but the results were not statistically significant.
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percent threshold, as shown in column (4). The explanatory variables also account
for a more significant proportion of the probability of failure in the subsamples of
banks with lower capital ratios, as indicated by the pseudo R-squared at the bottom.
As for the subsample of banks operating with intermediate EQUITY levels, both
structural liquidity and capital seem to contribute to their capacity to withstand the
crisis. The target coefficients are two and three times larger than those obtained in
the baseline regression. Conversely, the coefficients are not statistically significant
for the subsample of banks with EQUITY above twelve percent, as shown in column
(6), which is also consistent with the existence of threshold effects.
These results, together with those obtained in the previous section indicate
that the stability benefits of tighter regulations on liquidity and capital are moderate
for the average bank, but substantially more relevant for the institutions located at
the lower extreme of the distribution. Furthermore, the results suggest that, from
the financial stability perspective, regulations on capital are likely to play a more
critical role than regulations on liquidity. This poses a question on the extent of
potential differences in the target parameters across Global and Domestic banks, as
the former were typically more leveraged than Domestic banks in the run up to the
crisis. The next section explores for this possibility.
3.4.4 Are There Differences Across Bank Types?
To assess the extent of differences across bank types, we compute separate re-
gressions for Global and Domestic banks, and further split the latter by categories,
distinguishing between commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperatives. The
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results (Table 7) provide strong evidence that capital shortages played a more im-
portant role in the failure of Global banks, while liquidity was the key factor in the
subsample of Domestic banks. It is worth noting the magnitude of the coefficient
associated with EQUITY for the subsample of Global banks, which is almost 25
times larger than that obtained in the baseline regression. Using this value, a one
percent increase in Global bank capital in the pre-crisis period would cause a mate-
rial 4.8 percent drop in their probability of failure. This highlights the importance
of ensuring adequate capital buffers in the systemically-important institutions. In
turn, the coefficient associated with credit growth is also substantially larger for the
sub-sample of Global banks, suggesting that those engaged on a more aggressive
expansion in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail. Conversely, country-
specific macroeconomic conditions do not play a systematic role in the subsample
of Global banks. This is likely due to diversification effects stemming from their
international operations. In fact, as their operations span many countries, changes
in macroeconomic conditions in their home countries do not have a strong impact
on the likelihood of failure of the entire group.
In the subgroup of Domestic banks, cross-sectional differences are less stark, as
indicated by the results presented in columns (3) to (5). Capital shortages appear
to be relatively more important in the segment of savings banks, while commer-
cial banks appear to be more vulnerable to problems associated to weak structural
liquidity. In the segment of credit cooperatives, those more heavily engaged in non-
traditional activities, proxied by the ratio of non-interest to total income, were more
likely to fail during the crisis.
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3.5 Robustness Checks
To gauge the robustness of the results, we estimate a complete set of paral-
lel regressions using two alternative measures of bank liquidity and capital. As for
liquidity, we use the Short Term Funding Ratio, STFR, computed by dividing liabil-
ities with less than one year residual maturity to total liabilities. For capital, we use
the Basel Tier 1 capital ratio, CAR, defined as the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital
to risk-weighted assets. As mentioned before, this measure of capital is larger than
the one used in the baseline regressions due to the application of risk weights on
bank assets.
In addition, we explore with three variations in the definition bank failure.
In particular, we decompose the bank failure dummy according to its components
as follows: (i) banks that ceased their active status during the crisis or that were
reclassified to risk categories E and E+ by Moody’s; (ii) banks with regulatory CAR
ratios dropping below 8 percent between 2008-09; and (iii) banks included in the
failed list of compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2009).
The full set of results, omitted for brevity, is broadly consistent with those
discussed previously. Summary regressions replicating the baseline specification
with combinations of the alternative measures of liquidity and capital are presented
in Table 8. The coefficients associated with the STFR are positive, indicating that
bank reliance on short-term funding before the crisis was associated with increased
financial fragility. The set of regressions that use variations in the definition of bank
failure, presented in Table 9, are also broadly consistent with the baseline results.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
Overall, the findings of this paper provide broad support to Basel III initiatives
on structural liquidity and leverage, and show the complementary nature of these
two areas. Banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage before the
global financial crisis were more vulnerable to subsequent failure. The results are
driven by banks in the lower extremes of the distributions, suggesting the presence
of threshold effects. In fact, the marginal stability gains associated with stronger
liquidity and capital cushions do not appear to be large for the average bank, but
seem substantial for the weaker institutions.
At the same time, there is evidence of systematic differences across bank types.
The smaller banks were more susceptible to failure on liquidity problems, while the
large cross-border banking groups typically failed on insufficient capital buffers.
This difference is crucial from the financial stability perspective, and implies that
regulatory and supervisory emphasis should be placed on ensuring that the capital
buffers of the systemically important banks are commensurate with their risk-taking.
The evidence also indicates that bank risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis
was associated with increased financial vulnerability, suggesting that bank deci-
sions regarding the associated liquidity and capital buffers were not commensurate
with the underlying risks, resulting in excessive hazard to their business continuity.
Country-specific macroeconomic conditions also played a role in the likelihood of
subsequent bank failure, implying that banks failed to properly internalize the asso-
ciated risks in their individual decision-making processes. Thus, while more intrusive
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regulations entail efficiency costs, the results point to associated gains in terms of
financial stability that have to be pondered. This also supports the introduction
of a macro-prudential framework as a complement to traditional, micro-prudential
approach. In this regard, further work is needed to deepen the understanding of the
role of the macroeconomic environment on financial stability.
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Appendix A
An Index of Systemic Exposure to Liquidity Risk
In a first step I explain how to construct the index of systemic exposure to liq-
uidity risk of a banking system (hereafter, FPI). In a second step I explain why the
FPI is a better indicator of liquidity risk than traditional macro-financial measures
and compare and constrast them. For the contruction of the FPI I used bank-level
data and macro data. Bank-level information, specifically the financial statements,
is obtained from the Bankscope database. Using this source has two major advan-
tages: (i) the coverage is fairly comprehensive with sampled banks accounting for
about 90 percent of total assets in each country, according to the source, and (ii) the
information at the bank level is presented in standardized formats, after adjusting
for differences in accounting and reporting standards across countries. The major
limitation of the data is the lack of breakdown by currency of assets and liabilities.
We address the problem with aggregate data. For that and other concerns I use
macroeconomic data coming from the following sources: Quarterly Externl Debt
Statistics (QEDS), International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Economic Out-




The construction of the FPI is explained in four steps: (1) selection of the
institutions to be included and the level of consolidation of their balance sheet, (2)
the computation of a bank-level vulnerability measure, cash shortages, (3) the ag-
gregation of the previous measure and the mapping of aggregate liquidity shortages
into aggregate lending problems, and (4) the normalization of the previous measure.
• Step 1: I define the banking system in a broad way. In addition to deposi-
tary institutions1 I include other institutions that perform similar functions.
Following Bankscope classification I include: Commercial Banks, Cooperative
Banks, Real Estate & Mortgage Banks, Saving Banks, Finance Companies
(Credit Card, Factoring and Leasing), Investment Banks, Micro-Financing
Institutions, Specialized Governmental Credit Institutions and Other Non-
Banking Credit Institutions.
Bank holding companies are not included in the analysis when information of
the actual bank belonging to the holding company is available. The reason
being that the balance sheet of holding companies usually has risk charac-
teristics that are influenced by other non-banking subsidiaries of the holding
company.
I use, when possible, the unconsolidated balance sheet of the bank. Consol-
idated balance sheets often present a problem when subsidiaries of the bank
include insurance companies, changing dramatically the amount of securities
1Institutions that have access to the central bank.
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and ergo the exposure to liquidity risk. However a bank facing liquidity prob-
lems does not have full access to those securities. More over, when using
consolidated balance sheets the potential of double counting of balance sheets
are high if bank subsiaries of the institutions have not all being properly iden-
tified.
• Step 2: The FPI uses as a building block the methodology and weights defined
by BCBS (2009) for the purpose of computing the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR). Table A.1 presents the weights in a simplified version of a financial
statement, following the ”universal model” in Bankscope. I use those weights2
to compute a monetary measure of vulnerability: the potential shortage of
cash an instution could face if a liquidity shock realizes. The cash shortage












where WLk and WAh refer to the weight assigned by BCBS (2009) to the
liability k and to the asset h respectively, as described in Table A.1.
2Few weights have been slightly adjusted following IMF(2011).
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Table A.1. Stylized Balance Sheet and the Net Stable Funding Ratio
RSF ASF
1. Total Earning Assets 1. Interest-bearing Liabilities
1.a. Net Loans 1.a. Total Deposits, Money Market and Short-term Funding
1.a.i. Gross Loans 1.a.i. Total Customer Deposits
Residential Mortgage Loans 1.00 Customer Deposits - Current 0.85
Other Mortgage Loans 1.00 Customer Deposits - Savings 0.70
Other Consumer/ Retail Loans 0.70 Customer Deposits - Term 0.70
Corporate & Commercial Loans 0.85 1.a.ii. Deposits from Banks 0.00
Other Loans 1.00 1.a.iii. Repos and Cash Collateral 0.00
1.a.i. (Reserve for impared loans) -1.00 1.a.iv. Other Deposits and Short-term Borrowings 0.00
1.b. Other Earning Assets 1.b. Total Long Term Funding
1.b.i. Loans and Advances to Banks 0.00 1.b.ii. Senior Debt Maturing after 1 Year 0.75
1.b.ii. Total Securities 1.b.iii. Subordinated Borrowing 1.00
Reverse Repos and Cash Collateral 0.00 1.b.iv. Other Funding 0.75
Trading Securities and at FV through Income 0.15 1.c. Derivatives (NETTED IN ASSET SIDE)
Derivatives (NETTED IN ASSET SIDE) 0.90 1.d. Trading Liabilities 0.00
Available for Sale Securities 0.15 2. Non-interest Bearing Liabilities
Held to Maturity Securities 1.00 Fair Value Portion of Debt 0.00
At-equity Investments in Associates 1.00 Credit impairment reserves 0.00
Other Securities 1.00 Reserves for Pensions and Other 0.00
1.b.iii. Investment in Property 1.00 Current Tax Liabilities 0.00
1.b.iv. Insurance Assets 1.00 Deferred Tax Liabilities 0.00
1.b.v. Other Earning Assets 1.00 Other Deferred Liabilities 0.00
2. Non Earning Assets Discontinued Operations 0.00
Cash and Due From Banks 0.00 Insurance Liabilities 0.00
Foreclosed Real Estate 1.00 Other Liabilities 0.00
Fixed Assets 1.00 3. Hybrid Capital
Goodwill 1.00 Pref. Shares and Hybrid Capital accounted for as Debt 1.00
Other Intangibles 1.00 Pref. Shares and Hybrid Capital accounted for as Equity 1.00
Current Tax Assets 1.00 4. Total Equity
Deferred Tax Assets 1.00 Common Equity 1.00
Discontinued Operations 1.00 Non-controlling Interest 1.00
Other Assets 1.00 Securities Revaluation Reserves 1.00
Foreign Exchange Revaluation Reserves 1.00
Fixed Asset Revaluations 1.00
ASSETS LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
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• The methodology described in BCBS (2009) does not provide a way to properly
account for the implications of the currency specification of assets and liabil-
ities on liquidity risk. In addition, Bankscope does not provide a breakdown
by currency of assets and liabilities. As a consequence I design a methodol-
ogy to make the adjustment that relies on aggregate data. The adjusted cash


















T represent the amount of external short-term, external long-
term and total external debt that the banking system in country j has; WLbd
and WLsd are the weights on ”bank deposits” and ”senior debt” of liabilities,
and φ is a penalization factor that is calibrated to capture a tipical depreciation





from QEDS when avaiable. IFS was the second source and BIS the third
source in case the information was not available in the first two.4.
• Step 3: In this step we map the previous measures into a lending problem
and we aggregate the results. Lets define rnli,j as the amount of loans that
need to be refinanced to keep the size of the loan portfolio, which is computed
3φ was calibrated at 0.4. Sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to in a range of
0.1-0.7.
4Both QEDS and IFS include, in principle, all the external liabilities of the banks (others than
central bank) and should coincide. On the other hand BIS includes the external liabilities with BIS
reporting banks. In addition, QEDS shows a breakdown into short-term and long-term liabilities.











k captures the loan portfolio (ie, the accounts in the asset
side that represents loans to customers, as opposed to securities, deposits in
the central bank or cash in vaults) and ω is a parementer that measures the
typical rifinancing fraction of the loan portfolio.5 Then cnli,j = rnli,j − acsi,j
is the covered new lending of bank i in a scenario of aggregate liquidity stress.
Heterogeneity in bank positions can situate a bank in one of the following three
scenarios: (a) acsi,j < 0 , in which case rnli,j is fully refinanced and the surplus
cash, -acsi,j, finances other banks in the system that are less liquid or captures
market share (the procedure is explained below); (b) 0 < acsi,j < rnli,j , in
which case cnli,j is rolled over; and (c) acsi,j > rnli,j , in which case the bank
cannot roll over any loans and is potentially facing default if not financed by
other banks in the system. The aggregate covered new lending of country j






















(c)are indicator functions. I
i,j
(a) = 1 when the bank i in
country j belongs to group (a) (that is, when acsi,j < 0). I i,j(b) = 1 and I
i,j
(c) = 1
when bank i in country j belongs to group (b) and (c) respectively. The
parameter ϕ captures the sharing of extra liquidity of banks in group (a) with
5ω has been set at 27 . I have conducted a sensitivity analysis and results are robusts. The tests




banks in other groups.
• Step 4: I normalize CNLj, which is a monetary measure, by the GDP of
country j. Normalizing by GDP has the feature of partially controlling for
the relevance of credit, and of exposures, for the production process of the





k for country j, and the amount of loans requiring refinancing
in a given year, given by
∑
i rnl
i,j for country j. Although both have the
desire feature that measure more directly the size of the exposure relative to
the banking system, they fail to account how the banking system is relevant
for the production process of the economy, leading, perhaps, to a high index






Table A.2 describes the sample of banks used in the analysis.
6In addition, normalizing by GDP has the feature of controlling for the size of the resources of
the economy relative to the exposure in the case the banking system could be assisted.
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Table A.2. Sample of Banks in Emerging Markets
Country # of Banks Loans OEA NEA STF LTF NIBL Capital
Argentina 82 41.4% 48.3% 10.3% 82.2% 3.1% 2.5% 12.3%
Belarus 21 65.5% 20.5% 14.0% 84.9% 2.6% 1.2% 11.3%
Bolivia 13 55.7% 35.2% 9.1% 85.9% 1.0% 3.0% 10.2%
Brazil 124 35.6% 50.4% 13.0% 60.2% 11.2% 18.1% 9.9%
Bulgaria 27 62.6% 21.5% 15.9% 78.4% 9.5% 1.1% 11.0%
Chile 25 71.1% 16.9% 12.0% 73.2% 12.6% 4.8% 9.4%
China 130 49.3% 46.4% 4.2% 86.9% 4.0% 3.8% 5.4%
Colombia 26 62.4% 25.2% 12.3% 77.9% 4.6% 5.0% 12.5%
Costa Rica 63 64.7% 20.7% 14.6% 83.2% 0.0% 4.0% 12.8%
Croatia 36 59.2% 26.5% 14.3% 68.1% 16.3% 2.1% 13.5%
Czech Rep. 38 48.8% 43.8% 7.0% 74.9% 14.1% 4.3% 6.5%
Egypt 30 37.5% 52.5% 10.0% 87.2% 2.4% 4.3% 6.1%
Estonia 7 78.7% 11.4% 9.9% 81.5% 6.4% 3.7% 8.4%
Georgia 11 61.4% 13.9% 24.8% 54.9% 22.7% 3.0% 19.3%
Hungary 33 58.7% 33.4% 7.3% 72.4% 14.2% 3.4% 9.6%
India 85 59.0% 30.9% 10.1% 83.9% 4.6% 5.3% 6.3%
Indonesia 52 48.6% 36.4% 15.0% 79.6% 4.8% 4.7% 11.0%
Israel 10 65.4% 28.9% 5.5% 83.1% 4.8% 5.4% 6.7%
Jordan 14 48.2% 41.5% 10.2% 77.9% 2.0% 3.5% 16.6%
Korea 36 66.6% 24.9% 8.0% 62.7% 21.6% 6.2% 8.9%
The definitions follow from the balance sheet specified in table A.1. Assets are summa-
rized in columns three to five, which refer to net loans - Loans (1.a.), other earning assets
- OEA (1.b), and non-earning assets -NEA (2). Liabilities are summarized in columns
six to nine, which refer to short-term funding - STF (1.a +1.d), long-term funding - LTF
(1.b), non-interest liaibilities - NIBL (2), and hybrid capital and total equity - Capital
(3+4). Financial statements were obtained from Bankscope. All variables are measured
at the end of 2007.
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Table A.2. Sample of Banks in Emerging Markets (continue)
Country # of Banks Loans OEA NEA STF LTF NIBL Capital
Latvia 21 67.0% 27.0% 6.0% 87.8% 2.4% 1.2% 8.5%
Lithuania 12 71.2% 20.2% 8.4% 85.0% 5.5% 1.5% 7.8%
Malaysia 53 51.6% 23.3% 24.9% 81.4% 5.8% 4.4% 8.4%
Mauritius 17 53.3% 24.5% 22.2% 83.7% 4.6% 3.3% 8.5%
Mexico 54 60.4% 23.2% 15.6% 58.8% 14.4% 11.8% 14.3%
Moldova 14 61.6% 18.7% 19.6% 74.0% 5.9% 1.6% 18.4%
Morocco 15 50.1% 35.8% 14.2% 86.1% 1.3% 4.4% 8.3%
Peru 22 50.9% 31.1% 18.0% 80.9% 3.5% 5.6% 10.0%
Philippines 38 39.3% 45.7% 14.7% 77.4% 3.7% 7.5% 11.4%
Poland 51 60.2% 32.5% 6.8% 84.1% 2.5% 2.7% 10.6%
Romania 31 58.5% 16.1% 25.3% 82.4% 4.8% 3.4% 9.3%
Russia 227 61.5% 28.4% 10.1% 49.3% 29.2% 7.8% 13.7%
Serbia 34 51.6% 16.2% 32.2% 70.9% 4.4% 4.0% 20.7%
Singapore 22 46.1% 40.7% 11.1% 77.1% 8.0% 3.4% 10.5%
Slovak Rep. 19 49.8% 39.5% 10.1% 81.0% 7.0% 3.1% 8.8%
Slovenia 22 67.1% 28.1% 4.7% 80.8% 8.9% 2.2% 8.1%
South Africa 37 73.4% 19.9% 5.4% 78.9% 11.1% 2.5% 6.4%
Thailand 34 67.7% 23.9% 8.3% 82.9% 3.4% 3.7% 9.9%
Turkey 56 52.3% 39.1% 8.5% 71.2% 10.0% 6.1% 12.6%
Ukraine 47 73.0% 12.1% 15.0% 77.0% 10.3% 2.1% 10.7%
The definitions follow from the balance sheet specified in table A.1. Assets are summa-
rized in columns three to five, which refer to net loans - Loans (1.a.), other earning assets
- OEA (1.b), and non-earning assets -NEA (2). Liabilities are summarized in columns
six to nine, which refer to short-term funding - STF (1.a +1.d), long-term funding - LTF
(1.b), non-interest liaibilities - NIBL (2), and hybrid capital and total equity - Capital
(3+4). Financial statements were obtained from Bankscope. All variables are measured
at the end of 2007.
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Table A.3. Exposure to Liquidity Risk
Country RSF ASF CS FPI Country RSF ASF CS FPI
Argentina 60.2% 51.4% 8.7% -1.0% Latvia 66.3% 50.3% 16.0% -28.7%
Belarus 66.1% 61.8% 4.3% 4.0% Lithuania 71.4% 52.4% 19.0% -9.1%
Bolivia 89.0% 64.3% 24.7% -3.3% Malaysia 60.2% 61.8% -1.6% 28.5%
Brazil 55.6% 41.9% 13.7% -4.1% Mauritius 69.6% 67.4% 2.2% -2.0%
Bulgaria 58.3% 69.0% -10.7% 19.4% Mexico 67.3% 63.2% 4.1% 3.5%
Chile 74.2% 65.0% 9.1% 12.7% Moldova 70.4% 70.0% 0.3% 7.9%
China 68.0% 66.3% 1.7% 28.7% Morocco 62.4% 61.6% 0.7% 13.7%
Colombia 71.1% 62.1% 9.0% 5.2% Peru 70.0% 60.9% 9.1% 0.6%
Costa Rica 86.8% 64.4% 22.3% -3.7% Philippines 59.9% 67.4% -7.5% 11.1%
Croatia 58.0% 69.3% -11.3% 21.3% Poland 66.4% 65.2% 1.3% 7.3%
Czech Rep. 65.8% 68.9% -3.1% 10.0% Romania 54.1% 51.0% 3.1% 2.2%
Egypt 55.4% 64.2% -8.8% 18.3% Russia 70.4% 48.5% 22.0% -4.6%
Estonia 80.3% 53.8% 26.5% -21.3% Serbia 56.1% 68.6% -12.5% 12.4%
Georgia 71.7% 74.6% -2.8% 7.1% Singapore 55.2% 64.0% -8.9% 26.0%
Hungary 72.1% 53.2% 18.6% -9.0% Slovak Rep. 66.4% 63.3% 3.1% 5.0%
India 86.2% 64.6% 21.6% -2.0% Slovenia 71.5% 55.6% 15.9% -3.4%
Indonesia 63.9% 71.2% -7.3% 9.0% South Africa 74.7% 61.7% 13.0% 8.6%
Israel 64.6% 58.8% 5.7% 15.5% Thailand 78.3% 65.2% 13.2% 12.2%
Jordan 59.9% 66.3% -6.5% 20.3% Turkey 64.7% 63.4% 1.3% 8.6%
Korea 61.9% 55.9% 6.0% 16.3% Ukraine 71.0% 57.6% 13.3% 1.2%
RSF refers to required stable funding and is computed as specifified in table A.1. ASF
refers to available stable funding and is computed as specifified in table A.1. CS referes
to cash shortages and is computed as RSF minus ASF. The FPI is the index that capture
systemic liquidity risk exposure, which is computed as defined in this appendix. All
variables are measured at the end of 2007.
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A.2 Comparison With Traditional Measures
After reapeted crisis in emerging markets, the literature has identified some
macrofinancial aggregates that are relevant in capturing the vulnerability of such
economies to aggregate liquidity shocks. Three of them stand as the most robust:
(i) external short-term debt to GDP, (ii) growth of bank credit to the private sector
over GDP, and (iii) the loans to deposits ratio of the banking system. Berkmen et al
(2009) and Blanchard et al (2010) find that they are the most robust financial vari-
ables to explain cross country output collapse, inmediately after Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy. Their findings are replicated and discussed in detail in Appendix B.
I argue that the three macrofinancial aggregaes capture, in some degree, the
exposure to liquidity risk of the banking system. Table A.3 presents the correlations
between these aggregates and the FPI, but first I hypothesize potential links between
them :
• External short-term debt to GDP: When the banking system is the sector
borrowing short-term to external creditors it is increasing its vulnerability due
to a double liquidity mismatch problem. On one hand the maturity mismatch.
On the other hand there is a currency mismatch, even if the loans are specified
in the funding currency, always that the bank customer has business risk
specified in non-tradable goods. There are other channels throught which
high short-term debt, even when hold by other sectors of the economy, can
capture liquidity risks at banks. For example, banks could extend guarantees
and contingent credit lines to corporate that can withdraw heavily in times of
80
drying up of external financing.
• Growth of bank credit to the private sector to GDP: In emerging markets it is
typically the case that the local deposit base does not match the aggresive ex-
pansion in aggregate credit, and banks rely increasingly in wholesale interbank
funding to finance the gap, becoming vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
• Loans to deposits is perhaps the one with the most obvious relationship. Do-
mestic loans that are not financed with local deposits are either financed with
wholesale short-term funding, long-term debt or equity. The gap is financed,
into a large extent, by the first option and only to a lesser degree with the
other two options, exposing the bank to liquidity risks. A bank might well
have less leverage with a high loan to deposit ratio but it is almost certainly
more exposed to liquidity risks. In that sense, our interpretation differs from
Berkmen et al (2009).
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External Short-Term Debt -0.50 1
Growth of Bank Credit -0.57 0.65 1
Loans to Deposits -0.65 0.57 0.64 1
External Short-Term Debt is measured over GDP a the end of 2007. Growth
of Bank Credit refers to credit to the private sector and is measures as the ratio of
bank credit to GDP at the end of 2007 minus the ratio at the end of 2003. Loans
to Deposits is measured at the end of 2007.
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A.3 Other Tables and Figures
Table A.5. Core and Extended Samples
Country Core Extended Country Core Extended
Argentina X X Latvia X X
Belarus X Lithuania X X
Bolivia X Malaysia X X
Brazil X X Mauritius X
Bulgaria X Mexico X X
Chile X X Moldova X
China X X Morocco X
Colombia X X Peru X X
Costa Rica X Philippines X X
Croatia X X Poland X X
Czech Rep. X X Romania X
Egypt X Russia X X
Estonia X X Serbia X X
Georgia X Singapore X
Hungary X X Slovak Rep. X X
India X X Slovenia X X
Indonesia X X South Africa X X
Israel X X Thailand X X
Jordan X Turkey X X
Korea X X Ukraine X
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Table A.6. Selected Macro Aggregates for Sample Countries
Country UOG UPG ESTD LD CG Credit NPL
Argentina -8.9% -2.6% 13.0% 111.0% 3.7% 14.5% 0.3%
Belarus -7.5% -11.3% 18.5% 127.8% 13.1% 24.8% 2.5%
Bolivia -4.1% -5.1% 10.6% 92.1% -10.9% 37.0% -0.8%
Brazil -9.7% -1.3% 5.7% 155.8% 19.2% 47.9% 1.1%
Bulgaria -7.0% -8.3% 48.7% 98.9% 36.3% 62.8% 3.9%
Chile -9.2% -4.5% 14.0% 94.7% 9.9% 88.3% 2.0%
China -1.0% -3.9% 7.4% 94.7% -19.7% 107.5% -0.8%
Colombia -4.0% -1.4% 4.9% 122.8% 9.4% 30.4% 0.1%
Costa Rica -8.5% -4.0% 16.1% 110.0% 13.1% 44.4% 0.5%
Croatia -10.9% -5.4% 20.7% 113.2% 16.5% 62.3% 2.9%
Czech Rep. -12.0% -10.0% 25.3% 91.5% 16.2% 47.9% 1.8%
Egypt -3.9% -2.3% 2.9% 101.1% -8.4% 45.5% -1.4%
Estonia -24.1% -12.3% 49.3% 172.1% 43.3% 93.9% 3.3%
Georgia -12.5% -4.8% 9.7% 187.4% 19.6% 28.3% 2.2%
Hungary -12.6% -10.4% 27.8% 156.1% 19.1% 61.4% 3.7%
India 3.9% -2.1% 4.4% 101.0% 12.8% 44.8%
Indonesia -3.2% -3.4% 13.7% 109.3% 2.5% 25.5% 0.1%
Israel -3.5% -3.8% 21.4% 83.9% 3.0% 88.5%
Jordan -2.3% -2.9% 14.4% 94.4% 17.5% 88.3% 2.5%
Korea -6.6% -4.2% 15.3% 128.4% 9.3% 99.6% 0.1%
UOG refers to unexpected output growth, UPG to unexpected partner growth, ESTD
to the external short-term debt to GDP ratio, LD to the loans to deposits ratio, CG to
the growth of bank credit to the private sector, Credit to the amount of bank credit to
the private sector over GDP, and NPL to the change in non-performing loans over assets.
UOG, UPG, ESTD, LD and Credit are measured at the end of 2007. CG corresponds to
the growth between 2003 and 2007 and is normalized by GDP. NPL refers to the change
between 2008 and 2009.
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Table A.6. Selected Macro Aggregates for Sample Countries (continue)
Country UOG UPG ESTD LD CG Credit NPL
Latvia -26.3% -8.0% 78.7% 244.7% 48.4% 88.7% 12.8%
Lithuania -24.2% -9.6% 45.1% 163.5% 37.2% 60.0% 14.7%
Malaysia -10.3% -11.9% 10.9% 91.8% -13.7% 105.3% -1.1%
Mauritius -4.7% -5.4% 2.3% 107.9% 4.5% 77.7%
Mexico -14.3% -1.9% 5.1% 148.5% 6.0% 22.0% -0.1%
Moldova 2.0% -5.3% 33.6% 103.8% 16.5% 36.9% 11.1%
Morocco 0.1% -3.0% 2.4% 104.0% 16.0% 58.4% -0.5%
Peru -11.5% -2.5% 9.7% 68.6% 0.5% 21.0% 0.5%
Philippines -7.3% -4.8% 9.7% 87.7% -5.0% 29.9% -0.4%
Poland -3.8% -5.5% 21.4% 113.0% 11.4% 39.4% 3.1%
Romania -17.9% -3.3% 24.9% 114.1% 21.3% 35.1% 8.8%
Russia -18.9% -3.9% 16.6% 79.6% 17.6% 38.7% 5.9%
Serbia -10.1% -4.3% 13.4% 88.5% 15.7% 34.9% 4.2%
Singapore -6.7% -17.0% 13.6% 65.3% -22.4% 87.4% 0.6%
Slovak Rep. -17.6% -10.3% 24.0% 105.0% 10.5% 42.4% 2.8%
Slovenia -16.1% -8.6% 33.3% 158.1% 38.1% 79.5% 0.5%
South Africa -7.4% -3.0% 11.7% 107.6% 43.0% 161.9% 2.0%
Thailand -12.2% -7.7% 14.1% 106.0% 12.7% 113.2% -0.4%
Turkey -8.4% -2.7% 12.9% 120.3% 14.9% 29.5% 1.8%
Ukraine -21.2% -7.2% 27.0% 154.6% 33.6% 58.2% 22.8%
UOG refers to unexpected output growth, UPG to unexpected partner growth, ESTD
to the external short-term debt to GDP ratio, LD to the loans to deposits ratio, CG to
the growth of bank credit to the private sector, Credit to the amount of bank credit to
the private sector over GDP, and NPL to the change in non-performing loans over assets.
UOG, UPG, ESTD, LD and Credit are measured at the end of 2007. CG corresponds to
the growth between 2003 and 2007 and is normalized by GDP. NPL refers to the change
between 2008 and 2009.
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Table A.7. Unexpected Output Growth After Lehman’s Bankruptcy in Emerging
Markets (extende sample)
(dependent variable: projected minus actual growth from Q3.08 to Q2.09, saar)
Regressor
Unexpected Partner Growth 0.74∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
FPI 0.33∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.21∗∗
External Short-Term Debt -0.26∗∗∗ -0.13∗
Growth of Bank Credit -0.23∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗
Loans to Deposits -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗
Constant -7.33∗∗∗ -3.28∗ -2.49 7.00∗∗ -5.80∗∗∗ -5.09∗∗ -0.39
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-sq 0.47 0.51 0.5 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.52
1Robust standard errors,∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
2Forecasetd minus actual GDP growth of trade partners (Q3.08 vs Q2.09, saar), weighted by trade
and multiplied by home export share of nominal GDP in 2007.
3External short-term debt, on a remaining maturity basis, as a percentage of GDP, end of 2007.
4Bank credit to the private sector as a percetage of GDP, end of 2007 minus end of 2003.
5Total bank claims over deposits in depositary corporations other than Central Banks.
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Appendix B
Derivation of the Model in Chapter 2
A full maximazation is a possible approach to solve the model. However, its
simple structure allows us to solve it using dynamic programming tecniques. In this
appendix I use the second approach to work the solution.
B.1 Descentrilized Equilibrium
I use standard dynamic programming techniques to solve the competitive equi-
librium problem. I start with the t = 1 optimization problem and solve recursively:1
V i1 (l0, s0, b0,d0, L0, S0) = Maxn1,s1 d1i + V
i
2 (l1i, s1i, b0,L1i, S1i)
subject to
rL1 l0 + r
S
1 s0 + p
L








2is1i − (1− I i)b0 (B.3)
where i = n, z and I i is an indicator function equal to one when external
financing is recalled in t = 1 and equal to zero when it is rolled over. The euler
equations for s1i and l1i are :
rs2i = 1 + λ (B.4)
1We work in a model with no default of banks to households’ deposits. Thus, implicit in the




1i(1 + λ) (B.5)
When the external financing is recalled and the financial constraint binds,
s1z = r
L
1 l0 + r
S
1 s0 + p
L
1z(l0 − l1z) − b0+d¯. When solving the t = 0 problem the
representative bank knows that the level of s1z follows the contraint and takes it
into account. The t = 0 problem can be written as:
V0(d0) = Maxs0,l0,b0 θ
{
rL1 l0 + r
S
1 s0 + p
L




pL1z(l0 − l1) + rS2z
(
rL1 l0 + r
S






l0 + s0 = d0 + b0 (µ) (B.7)













= θ + (1− θ)(1 + λ) (B.8)
θrS1 + (1− θ)(1 + λ)rS1 = θ + (1− θ)(1 + λ) (B.9)
B.2 Constrained Planner
In t=1 the constrained planner has the same euler equations than in the com-
petitive equilibrium. However the planner recognizes that the returns of the assets























Notice that in this economy, where households have linear preferences in con-
sumption and own the banks, the problem of a contrained planner in t = 0 is to
maximize expected production. The value function in t = 0 is given by:
V0(D0) = MaxL0,S0,B0 Y1 + θY2n + (1− θ)Y2z −B0 − θS1n − (1− θ)S1z (B.12)
subject to
































2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (α + β)(1− θ)λrL1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ
rS1 + (α + β)(1− θ)λrS1 = 1 + (1− θ)λ (B.14)
B.3 Descentrilized Equilibrium with Policies
I derive the euler equations of the descentralized equilibrium at t = 0 with
policy instruments in the problem. Specifically I introduce five policy instruments:
• proportional tax on seeders: tS
• proportional tax on land: tL
• proportional tax on external financing: tB




• a cap on the size of credit to the private sector,2 represented by l0 + s0 ≤
χ2 (Ψ2)
The t = 0 problem can be written as:
V0(d0) = Maxs0,l0,b0 θ
{
rL1 l0 + r
S
1 s0 + p
L




pL1z(l0 − l1z) + rS2z
(
rL1 l0 + r
S






(1 + tL)l0 + (1 + t
S)s0 = d0 + (1− tB)b0 (µ) (B.16)
l0 + s0
d0
≤ χ1 (Ψ1) (B.17)
l0 + s0 ≤ χ2 (Ψ2) (B.18)
with the euler equations given by
rL1 + θr
L
2n + (1− θ)rL2z + (1− θ)λrL1 =
(1 + tL)
(1 + tB)
[1 + (1− θ)λ] + Ψ1 + Ψ2 (B.19)
rS1 + (1− θ)λrS1 =
(1 + tS)
(1 + tB)
[1 + (1− θ)λ] + Ψ1 + Ψ2 (B.20)
B.4 Proofs
Proof to Lemma 2: It is trivial to show that the contraint will never bind
in the equilibria where banks are unconstrained in both normal and crisis states.














2This is analogous to a cap on the growth of bank credit to the private sector. Althought
the model doesnt have a history, we can think on a repeated version where, in a second stage,
the parameter productivity augmenting parameter increases, increasing the optimal amount of
credit/investment to be made.
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equilibrium conditions and the fact that the aggregate amount of land is constant.
The previous implies s0 = s1n = s1z , and the participations constraint is equivalent
to





1zs0 − s1z − l0 − s0 + d0 + rL2zl0 + rL2zs0
)
(B.21)
where the constraint l0 + s0 = b0 + d0 was replaced. The previous reduces to
d0 ≤ d0, which is always true. In the equilibria where the transfer constraint binds
in the crisis state, it is true that rS1 = r
S
2n = 1 , what implies s0 = s1n since the
aggregate amount of land is constant. Lets assume for a momment that k is =1,
that is, there is no transfer from households to banks in the crisis state at date 1.
Then, the participation constraint is given by:






rL1 l0 − l0 + d0
))
(B.22)
where the budgen constraint s1z = r
L
1 l0− l0 + d0 was replaced. Re-writing the
previous condition
d0 ≤ l0(θrL1 +θrL2n+(1−θ)rL2z+(1−θ)rL2zrL1 −θ−(1−θ)rL2z)+(θ+(1−θ)rL2z)d0 (B.23)
where the first parenthesis is equal to zero by equilibrium condition (2.14).
Then it follows
d0 ≤ d0(θ + (1− θ)rL2z) (B.24)
0 ≤ λ (B.25)
which always hold with inequality when the constraint binds. The reason is
that the will be a liquidity premium in such equilibria. When the assumption κ = 1
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is relaxed, the participation constraint will still be holding since, the amount of cash
injected by the houshods (1−κ)w1h will be invested in seeders with return rS2z > 1.
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Appendix C
Tables and Figures from Chapter 3
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This figure presents the evolution of the structural liquidity and leverage for
the subsamples of Domestic and for Global banks during 2001-09. The solid lines
correspond to the median and the dotted lines to the 10th and 90th percentiles of
the distributions.
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This figure presents the evolution of the median structural liquidity and lever-
age for the subsamples of Domestic and Global banks, further splitting each group
in failed versus Non-Failed institutions.
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This figure plots the pre-crisis density functions of structural liquidity and
leverage for the subsamples of Domestic and Global banks, further splitting each
group in Failed and Non-Failed institutions.
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Figure C.4: Stylized Balance Sheet and Weights to Compute the NSFR
Wi Wi
1 Total Earning Assets 1 Deposits & Short term funding
1.A Loans 100% 1.A Customer Deposits
1.A.1 Total Customer Loans 1.A.1 Customer Deposits - Current 85%
Mortgages 1.A.2 Customer Deposits - Savings 70%
Other Mortgage Loans 1.A.3 Customer Deposits - Term 70%
Other Consumer/ Retail Loans 1.B Deposits from Banks 0%
Corporate & Commercial Loans 1.C Other Deposits and Short-term Borrowings 0%
Other  Loans
1.A.2 Reserves for Impaired Loans/NPLs 2 Other interest bearing liabilities
1.B Other Earning Assets 35% 2.A Derivatives 0%
1.B.1 Loans and Advances to Banks 2.B Trading Liabilities 0%
1.B.2 Derivatives 2.C Long term funding 100%
1.B.3 Other Securities 2.C.1 Total Long Term Funding 100%
Trading securities Senior Debt
Investment securities Subordinated Borrowing
1.B.4 Remaining earning assets Other Funding
2 Fixed Assets 100% 2.C.2 Pref. Shares and Hybrid Capital 100%
3 Non-Earning Assets 3 Other (Non-Interest bearing) 100%
3.A Cash and due from banks 0% 4 Loan Loss Reserves 100%
3.B Godwill 100% 5 Other Reserves 100%
3.C Other Intangibles 100%
3.D Other Assets 100% 6 Equity 100%
LIABILITIES + EQUITYASSETS
This table presents a stylized bank balance sheet, together with the weights
assigned to different assets and liabilities for the computation of the net stable
funding ratio.
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Table C.1. Sample Coverage by Bank Types
Non-Failed Failed Total Non-Failed Failed Total
Austria 142 0 142 4 3 7
Belarus 2 0 2 0 0 0
Belgium 8 0 8 0 2 2
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 0 3 0 0 0
Bulgaria 1 0 1 0 0 0
Croatia 5 0 5 0 0 0
Cyprus 3 0 3 2 0 2
Denmark 56 0 56 2 1 3
Finland 0 0 0 1 0 1
France 40 36 76 1 4 5
Germany 1274 6 1280 5 4 9
Greece 2 0 2 0 4 4
Hungary 3 0 3 1 0 1
Iceland 8 0 8 0 0 0
Ireland 1 0 1 1 0 1
Italy 27 0 27 2 3 5
Latvia 0 2 2 0 0 0
Lithuania 1 0 1 0 0 0
Luxembourg 3 0 3 0 0 0
Macedonia (FYR) 2 0 2 0 0 0
Domestic Banks Global Banks
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Table C.1. Sample Coverage by Bank Types (continued)
Non-Failed Failed Total Non-Failed Failed Total
Malta 1 0 1 0 0 0
Moldova Rep. Of 3 1 4 0 0 0
Montenegro 2 0 2 0 0 0
Netherlands 2 0 2 3 3 6
Norway 43 1 44 0 0 0
Poland 3 0 3 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 2 0 2
Romania 2 0 2 0 0 0
Russian Federation 60 17 77 1 1 2
Serbia 6 0 6 0 0 0
Slovenia 3 0 3 0 0 0
Spain 28 1 29 2 0 2
Sweden 60 13 73 3 0 3
Switzerland 241 6 247 2 1 3
Turkey 3 0 3 1 0 1
Ukraine 7 6 13 0 0 0
United Kingdom 6 0 6 3 5 8
U.S. 7950 715 8665 19 5 24
Total 10,001 804 10,805 55 36 91
Domestic Banks Global Banks
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Table C.2. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, 2001-07
Mean St. Dev. Perc. 1 Perc. 99 Obs.
Domestic Banks
NSFR 0.987 0.190 0.599 1.615 10704
STFR 0.059 0.100 0.000 0.480 10704
Money Market Funding to Total Liabilities 0.030 0.056 0.000 0.242 10106
Customer Deposits to Total Liabilities 0.894 0.124 0.429 1.000 10704
Equity Capital to Assets 0.101 0.044 0.025 0.251 10704
CAR Ratio 0.175 0.088 0.101 0.522 9260
Sharpe Ratio 0.050 0.048 -0.006 0.232 10704
Z-score 0.467 0.433 0.042 2.077 10704
Non-Interest Income to Assets 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.049 10704
Credit Growth 0.111 0.130 -0.084 0.661 10704
memo: Total Assets 2009 (Bln. USD) 0.7 2.9 0.0 11.3
Global Banks
NSFR 0.895 0.214 0.545 2.352 91
STFR 0.252 0.157 0.013 0.681 91
Money Market Funding to Total Liabilities 0.123 0.109 0.001 0.566 89
Customer Deposits to Total Liabilities 0.499 0.218 0.002 0.921 91
Equity Capital to Assets 0.063 0.035 0.014 0.205 91
CAR Ratio 0.132 0.075 0.092 0.766 83
Sharpe Ratio 0.067 0.118 -0.001 1.035 91
Z-score 0.441 0.712 0.039 5.910 91
Non-Interest Income to Assets 0.018 0.020 0.001 0.127 91
Credit Growth 0.198 0.145 -0.023 0.788 91
memo: Total Assets 2009 (Bln. USD) 527.1 707.6 23.1 2964.3
This table presents summary statistics of selected variables during 2001-07 (the period
preceding the global financial crisis). The statistics are computed over two subsamples:
Global banks and Domestic banks.
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NSFR -0.6030* -0.3288* 0.2816* 0.025 0.5899* 0.057 -0.046 0.1052*
STFR -0.4480* 0.5504* -0.6671* -0.064 -0.066 -0.022 0.088 -0.063
Money Market Funding -0.3463* 0.8658* -0.3513* -0.2146* -0.013 -0.1071* -0.086 0.054
Deposit Funding 0.3785* -0.8472* -0.7452* 0.2430* -0.1193* 0.016 -0.088 0.1936*
Equity to Assets 0.3362* 0.1429* 0.2449* -0.0774* 0.1469* 0.2237* 0.079 0.3864*
CAR 0.6090* -0.0636* -0.0667* 0.1183* 0.8173* 0.073 0.2353* 0.046
Credit Growth 0.0140* 0.0497* 0.0729* -0.0405* 0.0619* 0.1186* -0.036 0.029
Z-score 0.0722* 0.0102* 0.0110* -0.0150* 0.1290* 0.1738* -0.1130* -0.698
Other Income to Assets -0.0868* 0.3805* 0.4476* -0.3704* 0.1950* -0.0631* 0.0098* -0.0957*
This table presents pair-wise correlations of selected variables during 2001?07. Starred
correlations are statistically different from zero at the one percent level. Correlations in
the lower triangle are for the subsample of Global banks; correlations in the upper triangle
are for the subsample of Domestic banks.
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Table C.4. Baseline Probit Regressions for the Entire Sample
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Sample All Sample All Sample All Sample All Sample All Sample
NSFR -0.0690*** -0.0585*** -0.0461*** -0.0421*** -0.0431***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Equity -0.2341*** -0.1452** -0.2512*** -0.2008*** -0.1993***
[0.068] [0.069] [0.073] [0.072] [0.073]






GDP Growth 2001-07 4.1008*** 4.4759*** 4.3866*** 4.2473*** 3.9885*** 4.0479***
[0.336] [0.361] [0.356] [0.357] [0.363] [0.366]
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -0.9138*** -0.8543*** -0.8646*** -0.9469*** -1.0286*** -0.9738***
[0.281] [0.264] [0.266] [0.280] [0.341] [0.334]
Observations 10,896 10,896 10,896 10,896 10,896 10,896
Pseudo R2 0.0243 0.0225 0.0252 0.0322 0.0398 0.0399
This table presents the results of bank-level probit regressions with robust standard errors
[in brackets]. The dependent variable equals one for banks failing during the global finan-
cial crisis (2008?09) and zero otherwise. The regression coefficients have been transformed
to convey the change in the probability of failure associated with a marginal change in
the explanatory variables from their pre-crisis mean values. The two target variables are
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), and equity to assets (Equity). The explanatory
variables include a set of bank-level controls aimed at capturing bank risk profiles during
the pre-crisis period: the average yearly credit growth, the distance to default (z-score),
and the absolute value of non-interest income to total income. The explanatory variables
also include two macro-level controls, which are common to all banks incorporated in a
given country: the average GDP growth in the pre-crisis period, and the money market
rates. All the explanatory variables are measured by the average of the respective series
during the pre-crisis period (2001?07). Similar results were obtained by averaging the
explanatory variables over 2004?07 to check for an apparent break associated with the in-
troduction of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005, and using their values
as of end-2007. Starred coefficients indicate statistical significance at one percent (***);
five percent (**), and ten percent (*).
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Table C.5. Estimates of the Marginal Impact on the Probabilities of Default












NSFR -0.043 0.986 0.104 -0.45
Equity Capital to Assets -0.199 0.107 0.031 -0.63
Credit Growth 0.049 0.130 0.081 0.39
Z-Score -0.047 0.469 0.230 -1.08
Non-Interest Income to Assets -0.253 0.010 0.006 -0.16
GDP Growth 2001-07 4.048 0.026 0.005 2.16
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -0.973 0.031 0.007 -0.67
1/ Associated with a 0.5 standard deviation change in the corresponding variable.
This table presents the estimated impact of a change in the pre-crisis values of the explana-
tory variables on the likelihood of subsequent bank failure. The coefficients presented in
column [1] are taken from the last regression in Table 5. For each explanatory variable,
the pre-crisis mean is presented in column [2], and a 0.5 standard deviation is displayed
column [3]. The estimate defects, measured in percentage point changes in the probability
of bank failure, are presented in column [4].
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Table C.6. Probit Regressions by Sub-Samples of Liquidity and Leverage





















NSFR 0.009 0.0704 -0.1091* -0.0218 -0.0858*** -0.0018
[0.036] [0.046] [0.057] [0.018] [0.025] [0.023]
Equity -0.3490*** -1.1667*** -0.5937* -1.0045** -0.6343** -0.1475
[0.112] [0.447] [0.353] [0.404] [0.262] [0.105]
Credit Growth 0.1301*** 0.0885 0.2897*** 0.0881* 0.1902*** 0.0180*
[0.023] [0.056] [0.037] [0.048] [0.025] [0.010]
Z-Score -0.0543*** 0.0017 -0.0544*** 0.0029 -0.0542*** -0.0657***
[0.017] [0.012] [0.020] [0.009] [0.016] [0.018]
Non-Interest Income -0.2159 -0.4481 0.1243 -0.3947 0.094 -0.5872
[0.412] [0.838] [0.516] [0.598] [0.407] [0.447]
GDP Growth 2001-07 4.0177*** 4.7385*** 2.9141*** 4.5008*** 3.1336*** 3.5580***
[0.479] [0.679] [0.959] [0.585] [0.755] [0.715]
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -0.8515** 2.1617*** -3.0919*** 2.1699*** -3.2266*** -0.8456
[0.378] [0.800] [1.002] [0.809] [0.960] [0.542]
Observations 6,744 1,421 4,391 1,798 6,637 2,461
Pseudo R2 0.0478 0.146 0.0489 0.128 0.0424 0.0492
This table presents the results of bank-level probit regressions with robust standard errors
[in brackets]. The dependent variable equals one for banks failing during the global finan-
cial crisis (2008?09) and zero otherwise. The regression coefficients have been transformed
to convey the change in the probability of failure associated with a marginal change in
the explanatory variables from their pre-crisis mean values. All the regressions conform to
the same specification, applied to alternative sample partitions according to target levels
of liquidity and capital. The regressions presented in leftmost three columns correspond
to the subsample of banks with a pre-crisis NSFR below one and complementary intervals
of EQUITY specified in the headings. The regressions presented in the rightmost three
columns correspond to sample partitions by intervals of EQUITY. Starred coefficients
indicate statistical significance at one percent (***); five percent (**), and ten percent
(*).
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Table C.7. Probit Regressions by Bank Types











NSFR -0.3565 -0.0370** -0.0619*** 0.0520** -0.0322*
[0.232] [0.015] [0.020] [0.024] [0.017]
Equity -5.9592*** -0.1024 -0.0714 -0.4274*** -0.1476
[2.236] [0.065] [0.081] [0.142] [0.135]
Credit Growth 1.6543*** 0.0392*** 0.0372*** 0.0707** 0.0761**
[0.447] [0.012] [0.013] [0.034] [0.034]
Z-Score 0.0261 -0.0545*** -0.0777*** -0.0454*** 0.0064**
[0.063] [0.010] [0.013] [0.016] [0.003]
Non-Interest Income -2.8068 -0.3172 -0.403 -0.1616 1.8486***
[3.066] [0.309] [0.370] [0.455] [0.585]
GDP Growth 2001-07 0.208 4.1505*** 2.9101*** 5.7008*** 1.5062***
[6.940] [0.360] [0.590] [0.778] [0.507]
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -1.1448 -1.1965*** -0.7675* -0.7383* 2.8008
[1.512] [0.449] [0.440] [0.383] [2.688]
Observations 91 10,805 8,243 1,550 1,012
Pseudo R2 0.200 0.043 0.033 0.099 0.161
This table presents the results of bank-level probit regressions with robust standard errors
[in brackets]. The dependent variable equals one for banks failing during the global finan-
cial crisis (2008?09) and zero otherwise. The regression coefficients have been transformed
to convey the change in the probability of failure associated with a marginal change in the
explanatory variables from their pre-crisis mean values. All the regressions conform to the
same specification, applied to alternative sample partitions according to bank types. The
regression in column [1] corresponds to the subsample of Global banks. The regression
in column [2] corresponds to the subsample of Domestic banks. Those in columns [3] to
[5] further split the subsample of Domestic banks by the types specified in the headings.
Starred coefficients indicate statistical significance at one percent (***); five percent (**),
and ten percent (*).
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Table C.8. Robustness Checks by Alternative Definitions of Liquidity and Capital
[1] [2] [3] [4]
NSFR            
Equity
NSFR        
CAR
STFR         
Equity
STFR               
CAR
Liquidity Measure -0.0431*** -0.0409* 0.0449* 0.1523***
[0.015] [0.022] [0.025] [0.037]
Capital Measure -0.1993*** -0.1453** -0.2487*** -0.1840***
[0.073] [0.061] [0.070] [0.055]
Credit Growth 0.0487*** 0.0501*** 0.0495*** 0.0486***
[0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016]
Z-Score -0.0477*** -0.0626*** -0.0495*** -0.0641***
[0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014]
Non-Interest Income -0.253 -0.1859 -0.3128 -0.4828
[0.302] [0.346] [0.315] [0.375]
GDP Growth 2001-07 4.0479*** 3.6582*** 4.1631*** 3.9135***
[0.366] [0.567] [0.374] [0.582]
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -0.9738*** -2.0121*** -1.0647*** -2.8030***
[0.334] [0.728] [0.366] [0.945]
Observations 10,896 9,441 10,896 9,441
Pseudo R2 0.0399 0.0352 0.039 0.0379
This table presents robustness checks for alternative measures of structural liquidity and
capital. As for structural liquidity, we use the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and the
short-term funding ratio (STFR) as defined in the text. As for capital, we use share-
holders equity to total assets (EQUITY) and the regulatory capital ratio (CAR). The
corresponding combinations of these measures are indicated in the headings. The regres-
sion coefficients have been transformed to convey the change in the probability of failure
associated with a marginal change in the explanatory variables from their pre-crisis mean
values. Starred coefficients indicate statistical significance at one percent (***); five per-
cent (**), and ten percent (*).
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Table C.9. Robustness Checks by Sub-Components of Bank Failure
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Baseline




NSFR -0.0431*** -0.0186 -0.0282*** -0.0313***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.005] [0.007]
Equity -0.1993*** -0.1720** -0.1465*** -0.0527*
[0.073] [0.072] [0.035] [0.029]
Credit Growth 0.0487*** 0.0327*** 0.0182*** 0.0119***
[0.014] [0.011] [0.004] [0.004]
Z-Score -0.0477*** -0.0348*** -0.0016 -0.0238***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.003] [0.004]
Non-Interest Income -0.253 -0.3357 0.1739** -0.0446
[0.302] [0.293] [0.075] [0.119]
GDP Growth 2001-07 4.0479*** 3.9072*** 0.2065* 0.7779***
[0.366] [0.360] [0.107] [0.114]
Monetary Conditions 2001-07 -0.9738*** -0.7906*** 0.0261 -0.4991***
[0.334] [0.287] [0.029] [0.114]
Observations 10,896 9,713 10,896 10,896
Pseudo R2 0.0399 0.033 0.091 0.0814
This table presents robustness checks for alternative definitions of bank failure. The re-
gression in column [1] is the baseline specification, which identifies a failing bank by com-
bining four criteria: (i) a change in the Bankscope status from ”active” to either: ”under
receivership”, ”bankruptcy”, ”dissolved”, ”dissolved by merger”, or ”in liquidation” at
any point during 2008?09; (ii) a drop in regulatory CAR below the 8 percent threshold
between 2008?09; (iii) a downgrade in Moody’s bank financial strength ratings to E+ or E
(in distress); (iv) a bank identified as failed in Laeven and Valencia (2010). The regression
presented in column [2] excludes criterion (ii); the regression presented in column [3] cor-
responds to criterion (iv) only; and the regression in column [4] corresponds to criterion
(ii) only. The regression coefficients have been transformed to convey the change in the
probability of failure associated with a marginal change in the explanatory variables from
their pre-crisis mean values. Starred coefficients indicate statistical significance at one
percent (***); five percent (**), and ten percent (*).
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